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UNDO UNDUE HARDSHIP:
AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH TO DISCHARGING
FEDERAL STUDENT LOANS IN BANKRUPTCY
Aaron N. Taylor*
A debtor seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy must prove that
paying the debt would cause an undue hardship upon him and his dependents.
Undue hardship, however, is an undefined concept, flummoxing debtors, creditors,
and judges alike. The result of this ambiguity is rampant inconsistency in the
manners in which similarly-situated debtors (and creditors) are treated by the
courts. This Article argues that the undue hardship standard should be replaced by
a framework that uses debt service thresholds to determine the propriety offederal
student loan bankruptcy discharges. Eligibility for discharge would depend on
outstanding loan amounts, debtor income history, federal poverty guidelines, and
the type of academic program in which the loan was incurred. The goals of the
framework would be two-fold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform
means of assessing the propriety of federal student loan discharges, and 2) to
provide debtors facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it
with a simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.
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Undo Undue Hardship
INTRODUCTION
What does undue hardship mean?
Poverty or something less extreme?
The standard Congress left undefined
Prompting both debtors and creditors to whine
Judges have been given the difficult task
Of making sense of the mess at hand
Selecting which test should be imposed
Brunner? Johnson? Totality? Who knows?!
Should debtor good faith play a part?
What about debtor's right to a fresh start?
And in cases where hardship is undue,
Does full, partial, or hybrid discharge ensue?
Just some of the questions that come to mind,
Due to the standard left undefined
So with clarity and fairness overrun
Undue hardship should be undone.'
When Congress first imposed the undue hardship standard upon debtors
seeking to discharge student loans in bankruptcy, it intended the standard to be the
final barrier against debtor abuse. 2 Congress reasoned that the very viability of the
federal student loan program required that only honest debtors receive relief.3
Through the years, however, Congress fashioned the undue hardship barrier into a
bulwark, representing the sole means of getting student loans discharged in
bankruptcy.4 But while repeatedly increasing the standard's prominence, Congress
failed to increase its clarity.
Undue hardship is an undefined concept, flummoxing debtors, creditors, and
judges alike.5  The result of its ambiguous contours is rampant inconsistency.
1. This fit of artistic indulgence was inspired by a bankruptcy judge's poetic means of lamenting the
"unusual and confusing language" contained in the automatic dismissal provision of II U.S.C. § 521. In re
Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 703 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
2. 156 CONG. REC. E570 (2010) (statements of Rep. Steve Cohen) [hereinafter Cohen Remarks]
("Congress's intent in enacting [the undue hardship] provision back in 1978 was to protect Federal student
loan programs from fraud and abuse by student borrowers and ultimately to protect the taxpayer dollars that
fund Federal student loan programs.").
3. Id.; see also, e.g., Claxton v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass'n (In re Claxton), 140 B.R. 565, 570 (Bankr.
N.D. Okla. 1992) (reasoning that when debtors repay student loans, "they are helping to make education
available for others," and therefore Congress intended for student loan debtors' right to relief to "yield to
some extent").
4. See generally B.J. Huey, Comment, Undue Hardship or Undue Burden: Has the Time Finally
Arrived for Congress to Discharge Section 523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 89
(2002) (providing a history of student loan discharge provisions).
5. In re Claxton, 140 B.R. at 568 ("[Tjhe Bankruptcy Code does not define 'undue hardship;' and it is
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Judges define the standard differently, they impose different conceptual tests on
debtors,7 and when undue hardship is found, relief is often dependent upon judicial
philosophy rather than the merits of the case. In the end, similarly-situated debtors
(and creditors) are treated differently based on the courts in which they find
themselves, leaving an irony where inconsistency is the most consistent aspect of
the standard's application.
Inconsistency is not the only shortcoming of the undue hardship standard. The
premise underlying the standard's purpose is also illegitimate. In the 1970s, the
media began to tap into concern about the "rising tide of bankruptcies", 9 and
sensational stories about doctors and lawyers receiving student loan discharges "on
the eve of embarking on lucrative careers" began to damage public perceptions of
the loan program.' 0  In response, Congress restricted the circumstances in which
student loans could be discharged, making loans non-dischargeable within the first
five years of repayment," but still dischargeable thereafter. Accompanying this
new restriction was an exception that allowed for loans in repayment for less than
five years to be discharged in cases where a debtor could prove that paying the
loans would cause an undue hardship upon him and his dependents.12 In the years
to follow, Congress would lengthen and eventually remove the period of mandatory
repayment, making the undue hardship exception the only path to student loan
discharge.13  This gradual tightening was premised on preventing abuse of the
bankruptcy system and the student loan program by crafty debtors. 14 However, the
anecdotal evidence on which Congress relied has not held up to empirical
scrutiny.15
not clear exactly what it is that debtors must prove.").
6. Compare Skaggs v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Skaggs), 196 B.R. 865, 867 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla 1996) (reasoning that "undue hardship" should be defined using "the plain, ordinary meaning of
those words"), with Heckathom v. United States ex rel. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Heckathom), 199 B.R. 188,
194-95 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1996) ("Although the words 'undue' and 'hardship' are common English words,
their combination in this statute obviously constitutes a term of art, i.e., a phrase with a particular legal
meaning and function, which is based on but may be more specialized than common usage.").
7. Kopf v. U.S. Dep't of Educ. (In re Kopo, 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000) (discussing the
predominant tests courts use to determine undue hardship).
8. See, e.g., Grigas v. Sallie Mae Servicing Corp. (In re Grigas), 252 B.R. 866, 870-74 (Bankr. D. N.H.
2000) (providing overview of three judicial approaches to student loan discharge: full, partial, and hybrid).
9. H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 2 (1973) ("The most dramatic fact about bankruptcy administered
under the present Act is the rising tide of bankruptcies since World War II.").
10. Frank T. Bayuk, Comment, The Superiority of Partial Discharge for Student Loans Under II US. C.
§ 523(A)(8): Ensuring a Meaningful Existence for the Undue Hardship Exception, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1091, 1094 (2004).
11. NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 207 (1997),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/rcportcont.htm (follow links to relevant sections) [hereinafter
COMMISSION REPORT 1997].
12. Id. at 209.
13. See generally Huey, supra note 4 (providing a history of student loan discharge provisions).
14. See, e.g., Cohen Remarks, supra note 2, at E570.
15. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 1, at 53-54 ("Notwithstanding the notoriety of 'scam'
bankruptcies, absconding and concealing debtors, and other instances of egregious conduct in, and in
anticipation of, cases under the Act, the Commission has found little empirical substantiation that dishonest
conduct is a cause of bankruptcy in a significant number of cases."); cf COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra
note 11, at 82 ("But the statistical evidence suggests that consumers who file for bankruptcy today, as a group,
[Vol. 38:2188
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The undue hardship standard has another deleterious effect: it makes it difficult
for debtors to discharge debt incurred as a result of lack of information or
misinformation about educational offerings. Most students choose a college based
on very limited information. Information regarding school quality is sparse and,
where it exists, often inscrutable. 16  Additionally, information regarding the
financial implications of attending college often comes too late, if at all.' 7  The
resulting "information asymmetry"8 creates an environment where students are
more susceptible to bad educational matches' 9 or to being victimized by
misrepresentations or other improprieties. 20 When a student attends a school based
on lack of information or, worse yet, false information, her chances of completing
the program are diminished.21 And unfortunately, students who leave college
without earning a credential are often saddled with student loan debt that they will
likely have difficulty repaying.22
Few courts consider the value of the education received when making undue
hardship determinations. 23 The reasoning behind this approach is that the federal
government is not "an insurer of educational value." 24 It has also been argued that
a student loan is an individual investment, and therefore, the taxpayers should not
be held responsible if the investment fails to pay off.25 However, victims of higher
are experiencing a financial crisis similar to the crisis faced by families when filing rates were only a fraction
of their present levels.").
16. BRIDGET TERRY LONG, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, GRADING HIGHER EDUCATION: GIVING
CONSUMERS THE INFORMATION THEY NEED 1 (2010), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/12/pdf/longpaper.pdf ("[T]he process of college choice
involves simultaneously ranking options in multiple ways, relying on incomplete and uncertain information,
and receiving little or no support for interpreting the facts that are available.").
17. PAMELA BURDMAN, INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS & SUCCESS, THE STUDENT DEBT DILEMMA: DEBT
AVERSION AS A BARRIER TO COLLEGE ACCESS 9 (2005), available at
http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/DebtDilemma.pdf ("There is no clear or established division of labor
between high school officials, admissions and outreach offices and financial aid offices that ensures students
receive the information they need when they need it.").
18. The term "information asymmetry" denotes the difference in access to information between
education providers and education consumers. David D. Dill, Allowing the Market to Rule: The Case of the
United States, 57 HIGHER EDUC. Q. 136, 147 (2003).
19. LONG, supra note 16, at 9 ("Without easily obtainable information and a clear map of the key factors
worth considering and how to process them, there are many examples of decisions that probably represent
'bad matches."').
20. Dill, supra note 18, at 147 ("[B]ecause higher education in the US is an industry in which consumers
cannot objectively evaluate the quality of the service before they purchase it, an information asymmetry can
exist in which institutions may take advantage of consumers.").
21. Brian A. Jacob & Tamara Wilder, Educational Expectations and Attainment 18 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15683, 2010) ("The fact that most students attain less education than they
expect . . . suggests that misinformation is the cause of the gap.").
22. See LONG, supra note 16, at 9 ("[A]lmost half of college students who attend a four-year institution
fail to get a degree. Meanwhile, these students carry significant amounts of student debt that is not likely to be
justified without receipt ofa college credential.").
23. The Brunner test is the dominant undue hardship test. The court in Brunner argued that
"[c]onsideration of [educational value] . . . is antithetical to the spirit of the guaranteed loan program."
Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re Brunner), 46 B.R. 752, 755 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
24. Id.
25. Id at 755-56 n.3
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education misrepresentations are offered few avenues for redress by the courts or by
regulatory agencies.26 Courts are reluctant to recognize certain types of claims
against educational institutions.27 Regulatory agencies are more concerned with
protecting public interests than those of individuals.28 Thus, in order to provide
some level of protection to students who receive little monetary benefit from their
educational experiences, whether because of impropriety or simple misfortune,
bankruptcy discharge should be a viable avenue of relief from the burdens of
student loan debt.
This Article argues that the undue hardship standard should be undone,
replaced by a bright-line rule that uses debt service thresholds to determine the
propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy discharges.29 Educational value plays
a central role in the proposed framework, as eligibility for discharge would depend
on outstanding loan amounts, debtor income history, federal poverty guidelines, and
the type of academic program in which the loan was incurred. The goals of the
framework would be two-fold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and uniform
means of assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to provide
debtors facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it with a
simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.
The Article begins, in Part I, with a discussion of the factors that have made
post-secondary education virtually obligatory, including how salary and labor
market trends engender an investment mindset among students. Part II describes
the speculative nature of educational investments. Part III documents the trend
towards increased education borrowing. Part IV discusses the dismal educational
outcomes that contribute to student loan over-indebtedness. Part V explains how
lack of information and misinformation influence students' educational decisions.
Part VI highlights inconsistency and ambiguity in bankruptcy law, particularly in
the area of student loan discharge. And finally, Part VII presents the framework for
using debt service thresholds to determine the propriety of student loan bankruptcy
discharges.
I. EDUCATION AS AN INVESTMENT
We have all heard the axiom: Education pays. This simple declaration serves
as a compelling justification for undertaking-and in the process, investing in-
higher education. It is frequently the title encapsulation of studies, 30 reports,31 and
26. See Aaron N. Taylor, "Your Results May Vary ": Protecting Students and Taxpayers Through
Tighter Regulation ofProprietary School Representations, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 729 (2010).
27. Id. at 763 (explaining how the judicial concept of academic abstention disadvantages plaintiffs in
lawsuits against educational institutions).
28. Id. at 731.
29. Currently, the undue hardship standard is applied to private student loans in the same manner it is
applied to federal loans in bankruptcy. However, the framework proposed in this article would only apply to
federal student loans for reasons discussed in VII.A.6.
30. E.g., SANDY BAUM, ET AL., COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR.,EDUCATION PAYS 2010: THE
BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY (2010), available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/EducationPays_201 0.pdf.
190 [Vol. 38:2
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news articles32 extolling the virtues of education. If higher education was a
company, "Education Pays" would be its "Just do it." A review of relevant data
shows that education does indeed pay-on a wide range of quality-of-life
indicators. Higher levels of education are associated with various job-related
benefits, including higher salaries,33 better fringe benefits, 34 and more job
satisfaction.35 Education has also been tied to better health,36 increased parental
effectiveness, and greater civic behavior.38
A. Salary Differences
The decision to undertake higher education has been termed the "Million
Dollar Question". 39 This characterization references the oft-cited difference in
lifetime earnings between a college graduate and a high school graduate. 40
Research has concluded that over the span of a 40-year career, college graduates
will earn about sixty-six percent more in salary than high school graduates.41
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the median weekly pay for
bachelor's degree-holders is $1,053, while the median for high school graduates is
$638.42 These degree-based salary differences get larger as the comparisons get
starker. For example, the median salary for professional degree-holders is almost
four times the median for individuals with less than a high school diploma.43 Also,
the wage premiums associated with schooling increase as time in school increases.
The first year of college is associated with an 11% median increase in earnings; the
fourth year of college is associated with a 16% increase; and the second year of
graduate or professional school is associated with a 19% increase.44
The data suggests that the salary benefits of education appear early in an
individual's career. Among workers aged 25-34, bachelor's degree-holders make
31. See, e.g., Employment Projections: Education Pays, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (last modified March 23,
2012), http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart 001.htm.
32. See, e.g., Jack Z. Smith, A Simple Lesson: Education Pays, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, March 17, 2009,
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2009/mar/17/a-simple-lesson-education-pays/.
33. See BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
34. See id
35. Philip Oreopoulos & Kjell G. Salvanes, How Large are Returns to Schooling? Hint: Money Isn't
Everything 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Resarch, Working Paper No. 15339, 2009).
36. Id. at 10.
37. Id at 12.
38. See BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
39. Harvard researcher Bridget Terry Long coined this term as part of her research into college
graduation rates. Answering the Million-Dollar Question: The Problem of College Attrition--Could
Institutions Do More?, HGSE NEws, Apr. 16, 2003,
http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/features/longO4152003.html.
40. Id.
41. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 12.
42. BUREAU LAB. STAT., supra note 31.
43. Median weekly pay for professional degree-holders is $1,665 compared to $451 for less than a high
school diploma. Id.
44. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17.
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50% more than high school graduates.45 As such, an individual is able to account
for income lost while in school relatively early in her career. At median salary
levels, it has been estimated that it takes bachelor's degree holders about eleven
years to recoup expenses related to eaming the degree, including actual expenses
and lost salary.46  This means that the typical bachelor's degree-holder "breaks
even" on her education investment barely a quarter of the way into her 40-year
career.
The earnings premium on education has grown over the last thirty years.
During the period from 1980 to 2005, the earnings premium of a college degree
(compared to a high school diploma) increased 22%.47 Another study found that
the earnings premium between college and high school educated workers increased
30% between 1963 and 2009, albeit fitfully.48 Even after accounting for race and
years of work experience, researchers conclude that earnings premium trends
hold.49
The increased education premium is the result of both an increase in the
inflation-adjusted earnings of college degree holders and a decrease in the earnings
of high school educated workers.5 0 In fact, the decline in wages for those with just
a high school diploma is described as a "major proximate cause" of the increased
premium.51 But the larger cause of the trend is simple supply and demand. The last
thirty years or so have seen a decrease in the relative supply of college-educated
workers.52 As the economy has demanded more highly skilled, or college-
educated, workers and the relative number of such individuals entering the
workforce has declined, 53 employers have been willing to pay more for those
45. SUSAN AUD, ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2011, at 56 (2011), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011033.pdf ("[Y]oung adults with a bachelor's
degree earned more than twice as much as those without a high school diploma or its equivalent in 2009 ... ,
50 percent more than young adult high school completers, and 25 percent more than young adults with an
associate's degree.").
46. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7 (comparing the earnings of high school graduates to those of
college graduates and concluding that at about the age of 33 "higher earnings compensate . . . for four years
out of the labor force [and the] average tuition and fee payments at a public four-year university funded fully
by student loans at 6.8% interest."); cf id. ("The earnings of associate degree recipients lead to a crossover at
about the same age-after more years of work despite the lower tuition payments-because of the smaller
earnings premium.").
47. Jacob & Wilder, supra note 21, at 1.
48. DAVID AUTOR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THE POLARIZATION OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES IN THE U.S.
LABOR MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 5 (2010), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/04/pdf/jobpolarization.pdf ("In 1963, the hourly wage of the
typical college graduate was approximately 1.5 times the hourly wage of the typical high school graduate. By
2009, this ratio stood at 1.95. The entirety of this 45 percentage point rise occurred after 1980. In fact, the
college-to-high- school earnings ratio declined by 10 percentage points in the 1970s.").
49. See, e.g., BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 17.
50. See AUTOR, supra note 48, at 26.
51. Id. ("[M]ajor proximate cause of the growing college/high school earnings gap is not steeply rising
college wages but rapidly declining wages for the less educated-especially less-educated males.").
52. See id. at 1 ("[S]ince the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rise in U.S. education levels has not kept up
with the rising demand for skilled workers, and the slowdown in educational attainment has been particularly
severe for males. The result has been a sharp rise in the inequality of wages.").
53. Id at 25 ("[T]he skill demands of the U.S. economy did not stand still over the course of these
decades even as college completion rates slowed. Consequently, college graduates are increasingly scarce
192 [Vol. 38:2
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workers.54
B. Economic Trends
The modem economy is heavily tilted in favor of college-educated workers.
Technological advancements and foreign outsourcing have led to a polarization or
"hollowing out" of job opportunities in the U.S.55 The salient characteristics of this
trend are an accumulation of job growth at the extremes of the spectrum and a
diminishment of "middle-wage, middle-skill" jobs.56  For example, job growth in
high-skill fields57  has been strong during the last few decades; even during the
"Great Recession,"58 opportunities in this sector remained stable.59 Similarly, the
low-skilled job sector60 survived the recession with no net job losses.61  On the
other hand, middle-skill white-collar jobs declined by 8% and middle-skill blue-
collar jobs fell by 16% between 2007 and 2009.62 Based on projections, job growth
will be strongest in the high-skill, professional sector, followed by the low-skill,
service sector.63 These trends demonstrate that the bulk of the well-paying job
growth will be in fields that require highly educated workers who can think, adapt,
and thrive in work environments increasingly dominated by technology.64 Middle-
skill jobs that historically have required less than a bachelor's degree will be
increasingly replaced by machines or outsourced to lower-cost workers in other
countries.65
The trend away from less-educated workers has already begun in earnest. In
1973, workers with less than a college degree made up about 72% of the workforce;
relative to the set ofjobs seeking them.").
54. Id. at 6 ("One important proximate cause for the rising relative earnings of college graduates is the
slowdown in the rate of entry of new college graduates into the U.S. labor market starting in the early
1980s.").
55. Id. at 2.
56. Id. at 1; see also id. at 1610. (describing middle-wage, middle-skill jobs as "Sales, office/admin,
production, and operators").
57. Examples of high-skill jobs are "[m]anagerial, professional, and technical occupations." See id. at
10.
58. The term "Great Recession" is a popular reference to the recession that began in December 2007 and
ended in June 2009. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, It's Official: The Great Recession Ended Last Summer, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/political-
conomy/2010/09/its-official the great-recessi.html.
59. AUTOR, supra note 48, at 8 ("Employment growth in these high-skill occupations was robust
throughout the past three decades. Even in the current recession, these occupations experienced almost no
decline in employment.").
60. Examples of low-skill jobs are "["pirotective service, food prep, janitorial/cleaning, personal
care/services". See id. at 16.
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 12 ("The BLS forecasts that employment in service occupations will increase by 4.1 million, or
14 percent, between 2008 and 2018. The only major occupational category with greater projected growth is
professional occupations, which are predicted to add 5.2 million jobs, or 17 percent.").
64. Id. at 23 ("The secularly rising demand for literate, numerate, and analytically capable workers
stems from the changing job requirements of a rapidly technologically advancing economy.").
65. Id. at 2 ("The key contributors to job polarization are the automation of routine work and, to a
smaller extent, the international integration of labor markets through trade and, more recently, offshoring.").
1932012]1
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by 2007, that proportion had fallen to just 41%.66 The actual numbers associated
with these trends highlight the shift in even starker terms. Between 1970 and 2007,
the number of workers in the U.S. increased by 63 million to a total of 154
million.67 However, even with this 70% increase, the total number of jobs for
workers with less than a college degree fell by two million.68 Put differently,
college educated workers netted 65 million new jobs over this 27-year period,
which accounted for 42% of all the jobs in 2007.69 Add to that number the almost
26 million jobs that were already filled by college educated workers, and the extent
of the tilt in their favor becomes more evident. Moreover, economists project that
of the 47 million jobs to be created between 2008 and 2018, college-educated
workers will fill almost two-thirds of them.70 This trend will push the overall
percentage of workers with no college experience below 40%.71
C. Employment Trends
Unsurprisingly, given job market trends, college-educated workers are more
likely to be employed. In fact, education has been called "a pretty good insurance
policy for workers during the Great Recession." 72  According to 2012 BLS
statistics, the unemployment rate fell as education level increased.73 The rate for
individuals with bachelor's degrees was 4.9%, while the rate for individuals with
high school diplomas was 9.4%.74 At opposite ends of the paradigm were
individuals with doctoral degrees and those with less than high school diplomas-
the latter having an unemployment rate almost six times higher than the former.75
Even when assessing the employment-to-population ratio, a broader measure of
employment,76 it is clear that college-educated individuals fare much better in the
66. HARVARD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY PROJECT: MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF PREPARING YOUNG AMERICANS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2011) [hereinafter PATHWAYS TO
PROSPERITY], http://www.gse.harvard.edu/newsevents/features/201 1/Pathways to ProsperityFeb2011.
67. Id.
68. Id.; see also id. ("[O]ver the past third of a century, all of the net job growth in American has been
generated by positions that require at least some post-secondary education.").
69. Calculations by author. Id.
70. Id.
71. Calculations by author. Id.
72. ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., DEGREEES OF SEPARATION: EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE
GREAT RECESSION IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 1 (2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/l105 metro-america berube/1 105_metro america e
ducation-berube.pdf.
73. The unemployment rates for individuals with associate's degrees or higher were lower than the 7.6%
overall rate. Individuals with lower levels of education had rates higher than the overall rate. BUREAU OF
LAB. STAT., supra note 31.
74. Id.
75. Id. (listing the unemployment rates for individuals with doctoral degrees and those with less than a
high school diploma as 2.5% and 14.1% respectively).
76. The employment-to-population ratio is calculated using the employment status of all non-
institutionalized individuals of working-age (16 and up). The unemployment rate is calculated using the
employment status of working-age individuals, but only if they are employed or actively looking for
employment. As such, the pool of individuals accounted for in the employment-to-population ratio is larger.
See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BLS INFORMATION, GLOSSARY,
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job market. In 2009, 82.5% of all college-educated individuals were employed,
compared to only 67.253% of high school educated individuals. 7 7 During the most
recent recession, the employment-to-population ratio for individuals without a
bachelor's degree fell at a rate more than four times that of individuals with the
degree. 78
The benefits of education on employment transcend race and age. Blacks,
whites, and Hispanics all see greater odds of employment with higher education.79
For blacks, the employment gap between bachelor's degree-holders and those with
only a high school diploma was almost seven percent; among whites and Hispanics,
it was about 5%. Among individuals aged 25-30, an associate's degree serves as
an educational line of demarcation, with individuals at that level and above
experiencing significantly better job prospects than those below.81 Interestingly,
the benefits of education on employment do not just flow in the direction of the
educated. Among the twenty most educated metropolitan areas, sixteen
experienced below-average declines in employment,82 and these favorable
conditions seemed to protect less educated workers from some of the unfavorable
trends experienced by similar workers elsewhere.8 3  In other words, high levels of
educational attainment foster healthy job markets that benefit even the less educated
in those areas.
As part of a total compensation package, college educated workers tend to
receive better fringe benefits than their less educated peers. Access to employer-
sponsored pension plans tends to be tied to education level, 84 as does employer-
sponsored health care coverage.8 5 College educated workers tend to be employed
in more prestigious jobs86 and report having higher job satisfaction. Better work
http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm.
77. BERUBE, supra note 72, at 3.
78. Id. ("The employment-to population ratio dropped by more than 2 percentage points from 2007 to
2009 for working-age adults without a bachelor's degree, but fell by only half a percentage point for college-
educated individuals.").
79. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 21.
80. Id.
81. PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 5 ("Among all groups, young adults-aged 25 to 30-
who have earned at least an associate's degree, are significantly more likely to be employed than those who
have a high school degree or less.").
82. BERUBE, supra note 72, at 1 ("Among the 20 metro areas with the highest rates of bachelor's degree
attainment, only four registered declines in their overall employment-to-population ratio from 2007 to 2009
that exceeded the national average.").
83. Id. ("[E]mployment for workers without a high school diploma was also less impacted in these
highly educated metro areas than in other markets.").
84. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 23 ("[Seventy percent] of four-year college graduates were offered
pension plans by their employers in 2008. Employer-provided pension plans were available to 65% of
associate degree recipients, 61% of workers with some college but not degree, 55% of high school graduates,
and only 30% of those who did not complete high school."); see also id. ("Among those to whom these plans
are available, participation rates are higher for individuals with higher education levels.").
85. Id. at 24 ("In 2008, 68% of four-year college graduates working at least half-time in the private
sector were covered by employer-provided health insurance. Only 50% of high school graduates had this
benefit."); see also id. ("The gap between health care coverage for high school graduates and four-year
college graduates grew from 10 percentage points in 1979 to 14 percentage points in 1988, 17 percentage
points in 1998, and 18 percentage points in 2008.").
86. Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8 (providing results of an occupational prestige study).
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lives seem to contribute to better personal lives. Educated individuals are more
likely to engage in leisure time activities, including volunteer work and other
civic activities.89 This trend may be due to the better employment compensation
and the greater autonomy afforded college educated workers. 90 Many researchers
have found a positive correlation between education and healthy lifestyle choices.91
Educated workers are less likely to smoke92 or be obese.93 Additionally, education
has been tied to better parenting practices and outcomes. The children of educated
parents tend to be healthier,94 and they demonstrate higher cognitive ability95 than
children of less educated parents. The benefits of having educated parents persist
throughout the life of the child, with better employment outcomes as an adult being
a common manifestation.96 And if all those benefits were not enough, some
researchers have concluded that education actually makes an individual more
attractive.97
D. Societal Benefits
This discussion would be incomplete without a mention of the societal benefits
of education. Because educated individuals tend to make more money, they also
tend to pay more taxes. Typically, a college educated worker will pay about 80%
more in taxes than a high school educated worker. 98 Higher education is also tied
to less reliance on public assistance programs. 99  In 2008, 8% of high school
educated adults aged 25 and older lived in households receiving food stamps,
compared to 1% of adults with bachelor's degrees. oo And because college
87. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 19 ("In 2008, about 58% of college graduates and individuals with
some college education or an associate degree reported being very satisfied with their jobs, while 50% of high
school graduates and 40% of individuals without a high school diploma reported being very satisfied.").
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id. at 32. ("Both the percentage of people who donate their time to organizations and the number of
hours people spend in volunteer activities are higher among individuals with higher levels of education."); see
also id. at 33 ("In every age group, adults with higher levels of education are more likely to vote than those
with lower levels of education.").
90. See generally Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 6.
91. Id. at 10 ("Many studies find a strong positive correlation between schooling and multiple measures
of health outcomes, healthy habits, and healthy activities, with this correlation remaining large after
conditioning on income.").
92. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 27.
93. Id. at 29.
94. See, e.g., id. at 30.
95. Id. at 10.
96. Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 12 ("For couples with children, parental schooling
strongly relates to children's development and social-economic success throughout life. Health, social
integration, test scores, and labor market outcomes all correlate positively with both mother and father's
attainment.").
97. Id. at II (reasoning that "[m]en and women with more earnings potential or with more prestigious
jobs become more appealing in a competitive marriage market").
98. BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 10.
99. Id. ("Spending on social support programs such as unemployment compensation, food stamps, and
Medicaid is much lower for individuals with higher levels of education.").
100. Oreopoulos & Salvanes, supra note 35, at 8.
Undo Undue Hardship
educated individuals commit less crime, society saves on incarceration costs.101
When the benefits of education are added up, the grand total is immense. The
societal savings from an individual completing a college degree, as opposed to only
earning a high school diploma, "range from $32,600 for white women to $108,700
for black men." 102 So, does education pay? Indeed, it does.
II. EDUCATION AS A RISKY INVESTMENT
The payoff from education has cultivated an investment mindset among
students.103 A recent study conducted by Gallup found that eighty-four percent of
surveyed students strongly agreed with the statement: College is an investment in
my future.104 Seventy-four percent strongly agreed that "having a college degree is
more important now than it used to be." And even with increased costs of
attendance, more than half of students strongly agreed both that college is worth the
cost and that they were willing to stretch themselves financially to attend the best
college possible.106 This desire to attend college and willingness to pay for it are
reflections of the investment mindset that has spurred widespread participation in
higher education. But, like all investments, educational investments are risky; some
would say very risky. 107
A. Salary Trends
For starters, speculating on future trends is always a risky endeavor,
particularly when information is limited and options are numerous. The old
investment adage "past performance does not necessarily predict future results"
applies squarely to educational investments. While higher education seems
increasingly obligatory in the workforce, the relative payoff seems to be leveling
off, if not waning. Data compiled by the College Board showed that between 1998
and 2008, median salary increases for workers aged 25-34 with bachelor's degrees
barely exceeded inflation. os For younger workers with associate's degrees or some
101. BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 4.
102. These figures were calculated by estimating the reductions in public expenditures associated with
social programs and incarceration. Id. at 22.
103. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO PAPER: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
CONTRIBUTIONS TO FINANCING COLLEGE EDUCATION 4 (2004) [hereinafter CBO PAPER],
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/49xx/doc4984/01-23-Education.pdf.
104. The survey asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with a particular statement using a
five-point scale, where a '5' indicated strong agreement and a '1' indicated strong disagreement. SALLIE MAE
& GALLUP, How AMERICA PAYS FOR COLLEGE: SALLIE MAE'S NAT'L STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS AND
PARENTS 50 (2010) [hereinafter GALLUP], https://wwwl.salliemae.com/NR/rdonlyres/D5D78AIC-BBB8-
4D97-AE9B-7EC35558AD5F/13390/SLMGallupReportHowAmericaPaysforCollege8101OFINAL2.pdf.
105. Id. at 51.
106. Id.; see also id at 52 (indicating that more than 60% of respondents from the lowest income
households strongly agreed with these statements).
107. LONG, supra note 16, at I (citing high costs and low completion rates in describing "the college
investment" as a "high-risk proposition").
108. BAUM, ET AL., supra note 30, at 16.
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college experience, their salaries trailed inflation. 109 So while workers with college
experience fared better than other workers, 110 the college investment looks
surprisingly less favorable than the respondents to the Gallup survey would
probably assume.
Ironically, one of the most compelling illustrations of the risks associated with
investments in higher education is the most cited justification for incurring those
risks: salary differentials. As discussed earlier, higher levels of education are
associated with higher income. But the "Education pays" mantra largely ignores
the variable nature of educational outcomes. Just because the median salary for
bachelor's degree holders is higher than that of individuals with only high school
diplomas does not mean that every bachelor degree holder makes more money than
every person with just a high school diploma. I1  For example, about 20% of male
bachelor's degree holders earn less than the median salary for high school
graduates.112
Among women, 16% of bachelor's degree holders earned less than the median
high school graduate salary. 113 Another study found that more than a quarter of
individuals possessing a post-secondary certificate or license earned more than the
median bachelor's degree salary.11 4 These are not trivial exceptions. According to
Census data, 60 million adults aged 25 and over possess bachelor's degrees. 115 So
these exceptions represent millions of individuals whose education investments are
not paying off to the extent they likely expected.
A deeper review of the salary differential data reveals another important factor
that often goes ignored: the publicized premium on higher education is often
inflated. As mentioned earlier, one reason for the increased education premium
over the last three decades was an increase in the inflation-adjusted earnings of
college graduates.116 Cursory consideration of this trend might lead one to
conclude that recipients of all college degrees enjoyed the same, or a similar,
premium. However, most of the increase was experienced by workers with college
degrees beyond the baccalaureate level.11 7 For example, between 1979 and 2007,
the inflation-adjusted earnings for men with bachelor's degrees increased 10%; but
109. Id.
110. Id. (emphasizing that the decline in wages for younger workers with associate's degrees or some
college experience were not as steep as the declines for workers with only high school diplomas).
111. See, e.g., SANDY BAUM & SAUL SCHWARTZ, COLLEGE BOARD, How MUCH DEBT is Too MUCH?
DEFINING BENCHMARKS FOR MANAGEABLE STUDENT DEBT 7 (2006), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/pdf/06-0869.DebtPprO6O420.pdf.
112. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7; see also id (stating that 14% of males with only a high school
diploma earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor's degree holders).
113. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 15-16 (stating that 13% of females with only a high school diploma
earned as much or more than the median salary for bachelor's degree holders).
114. PATHWAYS TO PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 3.
115. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORE WORKING WOMEN THAN MEN HAVE COLLEGE DEGREES, CENSUS
BUREAU REPORTS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/education/cbll-
72.html.
116. A decline in the earnings of workers with only a high school diploma was the other reason. AUTOR,
supra note 48, at 26.
117. Id. ("[A] sizable share of the increase in wages for college-educated workers relative to noncollege-
educated workers since 1980 is explained by rising wages for workers with postbaccalaureate degrees.").
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the wages for men with graduate or professional degrees increased a much more
robust 26%. 118 For women, the inflation-adjusted earnings for bachelor's degree
and graduate or professional degree holders increased 29% and 37%
respectively.' 19 Combining these statistics, as is often done, likely overstates the
payoff from earning a bachelor's degree-and as a result understates the investment
risks.
B. Economic Trends
There is also concern that economic trends may be threatening jobs of college
educated workers in a manner previously experienced by workers in manufacturing
fields that did not require much education beyond high school. Nobel Laureate
economist, Paul Krugman, states, "Many of the high-wage occupations that grew
rapidly in the 1990s have seen much slower growth recently, even as growth in
low-wage employment has accelerated."1 20 The occupations to which Krugman is
referring are among those that require higher education, and his conclusion
acknowledges research showing that jobs in high-skill fields have become
increasingly "tradable", "offshoreable", or susceptible to automation.121 One
surprising finding is that jobs requiring higher levels of education might actually be
more susceptible to offshoring than those requiring only low-levels.122
The prevailing view seems to be that it is the nature of a job, not the skill-level
or education required, that determines its chances of being lost to foreign workers
or to technology. If the service can be "delivered [to its end user] electronically
over long distances with little or no degradation in quality", it is offshoreable (or
tradable). 123 If the job is sufficiently "rule-based," it can be automated. 124 And
these jobs are found across the skill and education spectra.125 In fact, employers
may have an enhanced financial incentive to automate or ship high-paying jobs
overseas.126 The implications of these trends on the educational investment are
118. Id.
119. Id at 27.
120. Paul Krugman, Degrees and Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A21, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/opinion/07krugman.html.
121. "Tradable" and "offshoreable" are largely synonymous concepts theorized by economists seeking to
describe the extent to which an industry and the jobs therein are at risk of being lost to cheaper workforces in
other countries. J. Bradford Jensen & Lori G. Kletzer, Tradable Services: Understanding the Scope and
Impact of Services Outsourcing, 1-22 (Inst. for Int'l Econ. Working Paper No. 05-9, 2005), available at
http://www.piie.com/publications/wp/wp05-9.pdf. See, also, Alan S. Blinder, How Many U.S. Jobs Might Be
Offshoreable?, 1-44 (Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Studies, Working Paper No. 142, 2007), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-ceps/workingpapers/142blinder.pdf
122. Blinder, supra note 121, at 33 (finding a weak direct correlation between "offshoreability" of
occupations and the level of higher educational attainment they require).
123. Id. at 2.
124. David H. Autor, Frank Levy & Richard Murnane, The Skill Content of Recent Technological
Change: An Empirical Exploration 1-45 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8337, 2000),
available at http://web.mit.edu/flevy/www/skillcontent.pdf.
125. Blinder, supra note 121, at 32.
126. Martin Ford, Can a Computer Do a Lawyer's Job?, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 15 2011, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/02/can-a-computer-do-a-lawyers-job/ 7 1238/.
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captured by Krugman: "It's no longer true that having a college degree guarantees
that you'll get a good job, and it's becoming less true with each passing decade."1 27
It should be noted that Krugman is not arguing against education; he is arguing that
education no longer provides a sure route to the middle-class.
When assessing the wisdom of any investment, it is important that costs and
potential payoff be considered together. Researchers have estimated that the "break
even" point for bachelor's degree holders occurs at about the age of 33.128 Based
on this estimate, the typical worker with a bachelor's degree has ample time to
realize a profit on his educational investment.129 However, a few trends render this
estimate less reflective of today's reality. Many students are attending college later
in life,130 thereby reducing the amount of time they are able to profit from their
educational investment. Also, many students are taking longer to complete their
studies,131 a proverbial "double-whammy" that not only reduces the amount of time
they are able to profit, but also increases the amount of time necessary to profit.132
In addition, education costs have continued to greatly outpace inflation,133 further
amplifying salary stagnation and extending the break-even point.
But even with these trends, most researchers still agree that higher levels of
education remain superior to lower levels in terms of investment payoff-at least
generally. So instead of "Education pays", a more appropriate tagline might be
"Education can pay", based largely on the type of degree earned and the amount of
time and money expended.
Irrespective of the risks, college participation continues to increase and, along
with increased education costs, has hastened the prominence of another form of risk
into the educational investment equation: student loans.
127. Krugman, supra note 120. See also id. (arguing that strengthening labor unions and providing
universal health care are more effective means of fostering prosperity than education).
128. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 7.
129. The educational investment (i.e. costs) consists not only of direct expenses, such as tuition, but also
opportunity costs, mainly in the form of lost income. See, e.g., id. at 4.
130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ADULT LEARNERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BARRIERS TO SUCCESS
AND STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE RESULTS 3 (2007),
http://wdr.doleta.gov/research/FullTextDocuments/Adult%20Leamers%20in%20Higher%/o20Educationl.pdf.
131. JOHN BRIDGELAND ET AL., CIVIC ENTERPRISES, ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE 13 (2011), available at
http://www.civicenterprises.net/reports/across the great divide.pdf ("[F]rom 1968 to 2007 the college
completion rate remained relatively constant while time- to-degree increased.").
132. Increased time in school is associated with higher education costs. See, e.g., Nate Johnson, Complete
College America, Three Policies to Reduce Time to Degree 1 (2011), available at
http://www.completecollege.org/docsffhree%20Policies%20to%2OReduce%2OTime%20to%2ODegree%20-
%20Nate%20Johnson.pdf. But cf, BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 13 (acknowledging that 43-53% of
students work while enrolled and these earnings reduce education costs by reducing opportunity costs).
133. See, e.g., FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID: STRATEGIC PLAN
FY 2011-15 iii (2010), http://federalstudentaid.ed.gov/static/gw/docs/FiveYearPlan 201 1.pdf [hereinafter
FSA STRATEGIC PLAN] ("The average cost of postsecondary education has been rising far faster than
inflation, increasing the financial pressures on students and their families.").
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III. STUDENT LOANS AS "ENLIGHTENED SOCIAL POLICY"
Education access has been an "enlightened social policy"1 34 of the federal
government for more than a half century.135  The federal government's role in
student financial aid was instigated in large part by race-based and class-based
college enrollment gaps. 136 Policymakers reasoned that financial aid would be an
effective means of spurring educational investments by members of
underrepresented groups. The idea of public investments in what is essentially a
private (or individual) endeavor has been justified based on the public benefits of an
educated populace and the public burdens of under-investments in education.137
The titans of the federal student aid policy are Pell grants and student loans.
A. Pell Grant
The Pell Grant Program was created by legislation in 1972 and is the hallmark
higher education need-based grant program. The program is behemoth, with
more than nine million recipients splitting grants totaling $30 billion during the
2010-2011 school year. 139 Very generally, Pell eligibility is determined by the
difference between a student's cost of attendance and her Expected Family
Contribution (EFC).140 Any difference between the cost of attendance and EFC is
covered by a Pell grant up to the Congressionally-stipulated maximum for that
134. The Brunner court termed the federal government's efforts to make student loans accessible to
students who would not qualify for loans in the private market "enlightened social policy". The policy
objective was education access. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756
135. The Higher Education Act of 1965 is said to have represented the first sign of a federal commitment
to access in higher education. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Gladieux & Jacqueline E. King, The Federal
Government and Higher Education, in AMERICAN HIGHER EDUATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 151
(Philip G. Altbach et al. eds,,1999).
136. See, e.g., SANDRA R. BAUM, INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, FINANCIAL AIS To Low-
INCOME COLLEGE STUDENTS: ITS HISTORY AND PROSPECTS 5 (1987), available at
http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED377265.pdf ("The changed social attitude toward poverty and society's
responsibility for economic conditions had created concern over the imbalance in college attendance by race
and family income.").
137. CONG, BUDGET OFFICE, THE CONG. OF THE U.S., A CBO STUDY: COSTS AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR
FEDERAL STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS 13 (2010), availabl at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/l10xx/docl 1043/03-
25-StudentLoans.pdf [hereinafter CBO Study] ("The benefits of subsidizing education may also outweigh the
costs when education produces benefits for society in addition to the private benefits enjoyed by the student.
Students may fail to take those social benefits into account when making choices about their education, which
provides a case for government subsidization.").
138. See, e.g., THOMAS J. KANE, THE PRICE OF ADMISSION: RETHINKING How AMERICANS PAY FOR
COLLEGE (1999).
139. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 2009-2010 FEDERAL PELL GRANT PROGRAM END-OF-YEAR REPORT 1 (2011),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-2009-10/pell-eoy-09-10.pdf.
140. The Expected Family Contribution (EFC) is a formula computed using information provided by a
student in her Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). The EFC is used to compute eligibility for
various forms of student aid. FEDERAL STUDENT AID, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., YOUR FEDERAL STUDENT
LOANS: LEARN THE BASICS AND MANAGE YOUR DEBT 39 (2010) [hereinafter MANAGE YOUR DEBT],
available at http://studentaid.ed.gov/students/attachments/siteresources/11-12YFSL.pdf. See generally, U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PELL GRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST P-3 (2010) [hereinafter PELL
BUDGET REQUEST], available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budgetibudgetll/justifications/p-
pell.pdf (explaining how EFC is calculated).
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school year ($5,550 for 2011-2012). 141 For example, a student with a cost of
attendance equaling or exceeding the maximum Pell grant and an EFC of $0 will
receive the maximum award. Students do not have to repay these grants, except
under very limited circumstances.142 The rapid growth of the programl43 has
become a source of concern, if not consternation.144 Ironically, even though costs
associated with the program continue to skyrocket, the "buying power" of the
grants continues to decline.
145
B. Student Loans
Federal student loans were first authorized in 1958 as part of the National
Defense Education Act.146 The initial program was extremely limited compared to
the system we have today. Roughly $300 million was appropriated over four years
for institutions to disburse as interest-subsidized loans to undergraduate students
with financial need.147 During the 1980s, student loans became the centerpiece of
federal student aid efforts. By 1985, student loans had grown to 50% of the federal
aid students received.148 In the time period spanning 2006-2012, federal student
loan volume more than doubled.149 The volume has increased almost 400% since
1999.150 Since 2006, the number of students receiving federal student loans has
almost doubled-now totaling more than 25 million.151 And unsurprisingly, total
141. PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 140, atp-3.
142. A student may have to repay a Pell grant in some cases when she withdraws from school. MANAGE
YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 4.
143. In the last decade, Pell expenditures have increased from about $8 billion to about $30 billion. In the
past three years alone, expenditures have doubled, with most of that increased coming over the last year. The
number of grant recipients has increased 46% over the last three years. PELL BUDGET REQUEST, supra note
140, at Table 1.
144. See, e.g., Richard Vedder, Pell-Mell, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 17, 2011, available at
http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/pell-mell/28873 (proposing various reforms to Pell program to reduce
costs and increase "bang for our buck").
145. The maximum Pell grant ($5,550 for 2011-2012) covers 32% of the in-state cost of attending a
public, 4-year college or university, down from 44% a decade earlier. The buying power at private, 4-year
colleges and universities has fallen from 17% in 1992 to 14% in 2012. COLLEGE BOARD TRENDS IN HIGHER
EDUCATION: TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2011 (2011) [hereinafter TRENDS IN STUDENT AID], available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/Student Aid 2011 .pdf.
146. Statement of Alfred B. Fitt, General Counsel, Cong. Budget Office: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education, Comm. on Education and Labor 3 (1979) [hreinafter CBO Hearing],
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/52xx/doc5223/doc20.pdf.
147. The original law set the program length at 8 years. For every $9 in loan funds received from the
government, schools were required to add $1. Interest was set at 3%, essentially the "cost of money". Id.
148. BAUM, supra note 136, at 41.
149. For FY2006, total new volume through the Federal Family Education Loan Program and the Federal
Direct Student Loan Program was $58,864,000,000. In FY2012, volume was $124,318,000,000. U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC. STUDENT LOANS OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST S-13 (2012) [hereinafter
FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST], http://www2.ed.gov/aboutloverview/budget/budgetl2/justifications/s-
loansoverview.pdf.
150. For FY1999, new student loan volume was $33,712,385,207. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL
STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS - LOAN VOLUME UPDATES (10/29/10) [hereinafter LOAN
VOLUME UPDATES], available at http://www2.ed.gov/finaid/profresources/data/opeloanvol.html (click on
appropriate year for spreadsheet listing data).
151. For FY2006, the total number of federal loan recipients was 13,667,000. For FY2012, recipients
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outstanding federal student loan debt has increased more than 540% since 2000,
now totaling $807 billion.152
There are three types of federal student loans: Stafford, Direct PLUS, and
Perkins. 153 By far, the largest of the three is the Stafford loan program, accounting
for 80% of new loan volume. 154 Stafford loans come in two forms: subsidized and
unsubsidized.155 The interest on subsidized loans is paid by the government while
the student is enrolled in school at least half-time and for a six month "grace
period" thereafter; interest accrues on unsubsidized loans from the point they are
disbursed. 156  A student can qualify for both forms of Stafford loans (up to
applicable maximums), with the subsidized amount being based on financial
need. 157
Direct PLUS loans are available to graduate and professional school students
and parents of dependent students.158 The purpose of PLUS loans is to account for
the difference between a student's cost of attendance and any other aid the student
has received, including scholarships, grants, and other loans. 159 Interest accrues on
PLUS loans from the point they are disbursed.160 In addition, borrowers must pass
a nominal check of "adverse credit history".161 Perkins loan eligibility is based on
financial need. The program is funded by a combination of federal and institutional
funds; only about 1,800 of the 2,900 institutions eligible to receive federal financial
aid funds participate.162
Most of these loans have to be repaid; however, the government subsidizes
loans mainly by offering them at lower interest rates than are available in the
private market and by tolling the accrual of interest for certain students.163 Most
federal student loans are offcred without regard to credit rating.164 So the subsidies
are greatest for individuals with bad credit, as private lenders would likely impose
higher interest rates.165 Moreover, the subsidies serve the access goal mainly by
totaled 25,124,000. FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 148, at S-13. See, also, LOAN
VOLUME UPDATES, supra note 149 (listing the number of FYI 999 federal loan recipients was 8,766,922).
152. CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at Summary (listing the outstanding debt as $149 billion in 2000).
See, also, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 149, at S-20, 21 (listing outstanding debt figures
for FY 2012).
153. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 5.
154. CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 1.
155. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 5.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. See generally, Federal Direct Parent Plus Loan Information, Office of Student Financial Aid,
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, http://sfa.osu.edu/forms/award/plus.pdf (last visited May 12, 2012) (listing
grounds for PLUS loan denial as loan delinquencies, "bankruptcy discharge, foreclosure, repossession, tax
lien, wage-garnishment, or write-off of Title IV debt during the last 5 years").
162. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FEDERAL PERKINS LOAN PROGRAM (2009),
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/fpl/index.html.
163. See, e.g., CBO PAPER, supra note 103.
164. See, e.g., MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 8.
165. CBO STUDY, supra note 137, at 10 ("[Tlhe government furnishes a subsidy.. whenever it accepts
terms on the financing it provides that are more favorable than the terms that participants in private markets
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providing a source of funds to many individuals who would not qualify for private
loans at all. 166
Even though federal student loans were introduced in a climate of "ideological
and philosophical objections.. .to helping students by making debtors out of
them",167 the programs' scope and size have been continually broadened, even
against early Presidential objections.168 Today, with outstanding student loan debt
expected to soon top $1 trillion, surpassing credit card debt, 169 popular discussion
of student loans is often captured in ominous headlines warning of "bubbles"
bursting and other financial mayhem. 170  So it seems that the ideological and
philosophical differences of yore are taking on new prominence as student loan debt
reaches uncharted levels. But like all forms of debt, student loans are a reflection of
larger trends, and the rise in student loan debt can be attributed to increased college
participation and increased education costs. 171
C. Increased College Participation
Higher education has experienced explosive growth over the last 40 years.
Between 1970 and 2009, enrollment in degree-granting institutions more than
doubled, from 7.4 million to 17.6 million.172 This growth is likely to continue, as
projections indicate that 19.6 million students will be pursuing college degrees in
2020.173 Increases in college-going rates among both "traditional" and "non-
traditional" students have fueled the growth. 174 In 2009, 52% of 20-21 year olds
were enrolled in college, up from 32% in 1970.175 Similarly, 14% of individuals
age 25-29, a non-traditional age range, were enrolled in college in 2009, up from
8% in 1970.176 Enrollment increases have been spread across all sectors of higher
education. Between 2000 and 2009, undergraduate enrollments at public, private,
and for-profit institutions increased 27%, 17% and 400% respectively.177  Post-
baccalaureate enrollments have increased as well, rising from 1.6 million in 1983 to
would demand to take on comparable obligations and risks.").
166. Id. at 24 ("[S]ome evidence suggests that federal policy has been effective at easing [credit]
constraints for most students.").
167. Id.at1.
168. CBO Hearing, supra note 146, at 3 (remarking in 1979 that Congress continued to reauthorize and
generously fund student loan programs over the objections of "every president since President Eisenhower").
169. Tamar Levin, Burden of College Loans on Graduates Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, at Al,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/12/education/12college.html? r-4&hp.
170. See, e.g., Larry Doyle, Are Student Loans an Impending Bubble? Is Higher Education a Scam?,
BUSINESS INSIDER, May 2, 2011, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/are-student-loans-an-
impending-bubble-is-higher-education-a-scam-2011-5#ixzzl NWOMVtet.
171. See, e.g., CBO STUDY, supra note 137.
172. AUD ET. AL., supra note 45, at 34.
173. Id.
174. FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 7 (defining traditional students as those who "go to college
directly after high school" and non-traditional students as "those who are 25 years old and above").
175. AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 138.
176. Id.
177. Public enrollments increased from 10.5 to 13.4 million; private enrollments increased from 2.2 to 2.6
million; for-profit enrollments increased from 400,000 to 1.6 million. Id. at 34.
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2.9 million in 2009.178 All of these increases are projected to persist at various
levels through 2020.179
D. Increased College Costs
College costs of attendance have been on a steady rise for over 30 years. The
average published in-state tuition and fees for a 4-year public college or university
was $8,244 in 2011-2012-an increase of 8% over the previous school year.180
Public out-of-state tuition and fees increased 6% in 2011-2012, to $20,770.181
Tuition and fees at community colleges increased 9%, to $2,963.182 Private 4-year
colleges and universities saw an increase of 4.5% in 2011-2012, to $28,500. 183The
average among for-profit institutions increased 3%, to $14,487.184
The annual increases in college costs have outpaced inflation. The decade from
2000 to 2009 saw yearly increases in education costs of 6.5% per year at public 4-
year institutions, 5.6% at private 4-year schools, and 5.3% at community
colleges. Since 2006, costs at for-profit schools have increased 7.6% per year.
Inflation during this period was about 2.5% per year.186
The rise in educations costs is showing no signs of abating, with further
increases projected through 2015.187 If these increases continue at the same rates,
the costs of attending college in 2015 will be more than double the costs in 2000.188
It is important to point out that not all students pay the published tuition rate. After
various forms of aid are applied, many, if not most, students pay much less. But
even net prices are higher today than they were in 2000.189
Increases in college costs have played out in the context of stagnant and
declining wages. And while the cited reasons for the increases vary, 190 the
consensus seems to be that the increases are unsustainable. 19 1 Families are already
178. Id. at 36.
179. Id. ("Fall enrollment in postbaccalaureate programs is projected to increase through 2020 to 3.4
million students.").
180. COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY & POLICY CENTER, TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING 2011 (2011)
[hereinafter TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING], available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/CollegePricing_2011 .pdf.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 5. See generally, AUD ET. AL., supra note 45, at 132
(explaining that total cost of attendance "includes tuition and fees, books and materials, and an allowance for
living expenses.").
186. Id.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id.
189. AUD ET. AL.. supra note 45, at 128 ("For low-income, middle-income and high-income families, the
net price increased, respectively by $1,400, $2,200, and $3,600.").
190. Taylor, supra note 26, at 749 (explaining that declining state funding for higher education has
prompted schools to raise revenue through tuition increases). See also, Dill, supra note 18, at 143 (citing
theory that asserts increased competition among institutions for prestige has engendered tuition increases).
191. See, e.g., TRENDS IN COLLEGE PRICING, supra note 180, at 9.
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responding strongly to the increased costs. The Gallup survey found that 63% of
families disqualified schools based on costs; this was 7% higher than the previous
year.192 Additionally, tuition increases were the greatest worry among white, black
and Hispanic parents.193  "Extreme" worry about the economics of attending
college increased as income-level decreased.194 This finding, while intuitive, is a
little ironic, given that poorer students tend to pay lower net prices for college. The
finding is also troubling, given that negative perceptions of costs can depress
enrollments rates among groups that are already underrepresented in college.195
E. Increased Loan Reliance
Increases in student loan interest rates were the second biggest worry among
white, black and Hispanic parents.196 The parents' concern makes sense, given the
extent to which their children will likely rely on student loans to pay for college.
The recession brought about a decline in the availability of non-federal college
funding sources. 197  This declination has coincided with a rise in student loan
borrowing. During the 2008-2009 school year, 56% of full-time undergraduate
students utilized students loans;198 this was up from 45% during 1999-2000. 199 The
average loan from all sources, including private loans, was $8,200 in 2007-2008
compared to an inflation-adjusted $6,500 in 1999-2000.200
1. Degree Type
Comparing graduates who received their degrees in 2008 to those who did so in
1996 illustrates a startling trend: bachelor's degree recipients who graduated in
2008 with debt borrowed $23,287, compared to $17,075 among 1996 graduates-a
36% increase; those who graduated with associate's degrees with debt borrowed
$13,321 in 2008, compared to $7,751 in 1996-a 72% increase; certificate program
graduates with debt borrowed $11,427 in 2008, compared to $7,300 in 1996-a
192. GALLUP, supra note 104, at 43.
193. Concern about tuition increases exceeded those related to things like joblessness and decreases in
savings, investments, and home values. Id. at 54.
194. Id. ("More respondents from households with annual incomes of less than $35,000 were extremely
worried about all of the economic factors while many fewer families with incomes of $150,000 or more
reported being extremely worried.")
195. See, e.g., BURDMAN, supra note 17.
196. GALLUP, supra note 104, at 53.
197. Not only did the recession decrease family, institutional, and state funding sources, it also led to a
decline in the availability of private student loans. The latter effect has led to increased reliance on federal
student loans. Federal loans offer much more favorable repayment terms than private loans, including
subsidized interest rates, multiple repayment options, hardship deferments and forbearances, and no credit
check. See, e.g., MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 6.
198. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 132. See also, Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 75 Fed. Reg.
142, at 101 (proposed July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 668) [hereinafter Program Integrity]
(stating that at four-year institutions, more than half of full-time students make use of student loans, compared
to about 17% twenty years ago).
199. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 126.
200. Id.
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57% increase.201 In addition, the percentage of graduates with more than $15,000
202in debt increased more than 50% between 1996 and 2008. About 17% of all
bachelor's degree graduates had debt of $30,500 or more-a threshold that is
considered "high-debt". 203
2. Institution Type
Borrowing rates vary among different types of institutions, but they have
increased across all of them.204 Half of 2008 graduates of public colleges and
universities had student loan debt, compared to 46% in 1996.205 Among private
institution graduates, borrowing rates increased from 59% in 1996 to 72% in
2008.206 The largest increase, however, was in the for-profit sector. Ninety-five
percent of 2008 graduates borrowed money for school, compared to 77% in
1996.207 Debt loads increased across all institution types as well. Debt among
graduates from public institutions who borrowed increased almost 29%, from
$15,599 among 1996 graduates to $20,087 among 2008 graduates.208 Private
school graduates saw their debt increase 41%, $19,852 in 1996 and $28,039 in
2008.209 During a shorter timeframe, 2004-2008, graduates with debt from for-
profit schools saw their debt increase about 10%, from $30,106 in 2004 to $33,046
in 2008.210
3. Socioeconomic Level and Race
Even though low-income students tend to pay lower net tuition, they rely on
student loans more heavily than other students. The typical low-income student
relied on loans to pay about 18% of the total cost of attending college; middle-
income and high income students relied on loans for 15% and 7% respectively. 211
There is a racial component to these income-based borrowing trends, particularly as
they relate to black students. Black students disproportionately come from low-
201. REBECCA HINZE-FIFER & RICHARD FRY, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE RISE OF COLLEGE STUDENT
BORROWING 5 (2010), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/social-trends-2010-student-
borrowing.pdf.
202. Id. at 8.
203. SANDY BAUM & PATRICIA STEELE, COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY AND POLICY CENTER, WHO
BORROWS MOST? BACHELOR'S DEGREE RECIPIENTS WITH HIGH LEVELS OF STUDENT DEBT 10 (2010),
available at http://www.collegeboard.com/prod downloads/trends/trends-who-borrows-most-bief.pdf
204. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 128 ("When adjusted for inflation to 2009-10 dollars, the average
amount borrowed by students at each of the six major combinations of institution level and control was higher
in 2007-08 than in 1999-2000.").
205. HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 202, at 3.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 8.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. GALLUP, supra note 104, at 18.
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income households,212 and this trend contributes to disproportionately high debt
levels.213 Income levels, however, do not fully explain the higher debt among black
students;214 institution choice plays a role as well. Seventeen percent of black
students attend for-profit institutions, which is almost double the next highest
proportion for other racial/ethnic groups.215 Students at for-profit schools have the
highest borrowing rates and debt in higher education.216 Additionally, students at
for-profit institutions are more likely to be classified as "independent"217 for
financial aid purposes, and thus able to borrow more money and accumulate more
debt.218 Almost a quarter of 2008 graduates who were independent students are at
or above the high-debt threshold of $30,500.219 Based on enrollment and
borrowing trends, black students likely make up a disproportionately high
proportion of this group.
High student loan debt would not be a problem if all borrowers completed their
academic or training programs and got jobs that paid sufficiently high wages. In
fact, under that ideal scenario, the concept of "high debt" would not even exist.
Alas, we do not live in Utopia, and there are many people facing high student loan
debt, low (or no) wages, and unfulfilled college aspirations. When the latter takes
the form of failure to complete an academic or training program, it becomes
particularly crippling to realize a return on the educational investment. Failure to
complete an academic program is a strong predictor of student loan default.220 And
unfortunately, failure to complete is an all-too-common outcome in U.S. higher
education.
IV. FAILURE TO COMPLETE AS INVESTMENT FAILURE
Higher education failure is a serious problem. Long the envy of higher
education in the world, the U.S. now has the highest failure rate among
industrialized countries.221 Today, almost half of individuals who begin an
academic or training program fail to complete.222 This trend is exemplified in how
212. A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy Reform, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 919, 935 (2006).
213. BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 6 ("High debt levels are more prevalent among black
bachelor's degree recipients than among those from other racial/ethnic groups... Twenty-seven percent of
2007-08 black bachelor's degree recipients borrowed $30,500 or more, compared to 16% of whites, 14% of
Hispanics/Latinos, and 9% of Asians.").
214. Id.
215. Other proportions are as follows: Hispanic: 10.1%, American Indian/Alaska Native: 9.4%, White:
7.4%, Asian/Pacific Islander: 5.2%. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 273.
216. See, e.g., HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201.
217. According to federal student loan guidelines, an "independent student" is someone who is "at least
24 years old, married, a graduate or professional student, a veteran, a member of the armed forces, an orphan,
a ward of the court, someone with legal dependents other than a spouse, an emancipated minor, or is homeless
or at risk of homelessness." MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 40.
218. HINZE-PIFER & FRY, supra note 201, at 9.
219. BAUM & STEELE, supra note 203, at 3.
220. Program Integrity, supra note 198, at 102.
221. PATHWAYS To PROSPERITY, supra note 66, at 10.
222. Id. at 38. But it is important to note that completion rates are measured in terms of specific
timeframes, usually 150% of the intended program length, and therefore do not account for completion that
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the U.S. compares to other countries in terms of educational attainment: Among
individuals aged 55-64, the U.S. is first in higher education attainment; 4 th among
35-44 year olds; and 10th among 25-34 year olds.223 Younger generations are at
risk of achieving the dubious distinction of being less educated, proportionally, than
their parents. 224 So while noteworthy progress has been made in broadening higher
education access, completion rates leave much to be desired. Fortunately, given the
level of public and private investments in higher education, the predominant policy
focus is shifting beyond access and beginning to encompass completion.
A. Completion Rates
Completion rates vary across program and institution type. Overall, 57% of
students who entered a 4-year academic program in fall 2002 graduated within 6
years.225 Put the other way, more than 40% of these individuals did not complete
their programs. Associate's degree and certificate completion rates are even more
dismal. Only 27% of full-time students who entered such programs in fall 2005
graduated within three years.226 By institution type, 65% of bachelor's degree
seekers at private schools completed their degrees, while only 55% of those at
public institutions did so-and, worse yet, only 22% of students at for-profit
schools managed to finish.227
Large disparities in completion exist across racial and ethnic lines. Among
white, black and Hispanic students in 4-year programs, completion rates were 60%,
40%, and 49% respectively.228 The highest completion rates were among students
of Asian/Pacific Islander descent, at 67%; the lowest were among Native
Americans, at 38%.229 Among white, black and Hispanic students in Associate's or
certificate programs, completion rates were 29%, 23%, and 26% respectively. 230
Asian/Pacific Islanders were the only racial/ethnic group with a completion rate
above 30%.231
Socioeconomic background characteristics have been found to influence
completion rates.232 A study of students at flagship public universities found that
income and parents' education each influenced graduation rates.233 On a whole,
occurs later. For example, failure to complete a 4-year academic program within 6 years is considered non-
completion, even if the student completes the degree later. See, e.g., AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72.
223. BRIDGELAND ET AL., supra note 131, at 7.
224. Id.
225. AUD ET AL., supra note 45, at 72.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 73.
231. Id.
232. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 34 ("High school graduates from low-income backgrounds, those
whose parents did not go to college, and black and Hispanic students have lower college enrollment rates and
much lower educational attainment rates than others.").
233. The graduation rate for high-income students was 83%, while the rate for low-income students was
70%. After controlling for various background characteristics (e.g. entrance exam scores), parents' education
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students from high-income backgrounds, with college-educated parents, were found
most likely to graduate from these universities.234
The effects of socioeconomic factors on college participation and completion
are topics of intense inquiry. The interest is well-placed because these factors likely
provide much of the context in which disparities play out. Socioeconomic
background influences pre-college academic preparation,235 college options and
choices,236 and ability to pay237 in intertwining fashion. Inadequate academic
preparation diminishes college participation and completion rates,
disproportionately affecting students of color and the poor.238 Inadequate academic
preparation, along with insufficient ability to pay, can often restrict college
choices.239 Insufficient ability to pay can keep even academically qualified
students from completing college-or attending at all.240 With all of these factors
at play, it is easy to imagine how the disadvantages of poverty can compound,
diminishing an individual's chances of completing college and resulting in the
disparities discussed earlier.
B. Cohort Default Rates
Short of bankruptcy, cohort default rates are the most direct expression of
educational investment failure. Cohort default rates represent the percentage of
federal student loan defaulters from a particular educational institution.241
Calculating a school's cohort default rate is pretty straightforward-in theory, of
course. The Department of Education (ED) identifies a cohort by determining the
number of former students who went into repayment during a particular fiscal year.
ED then determines the number of individuals from that cohort who have defaulted
on their student loans during the "cohort default period" (usually about two years).
The rate is then calculated by dividing the number of defaulters by the total number
and income level each contributed to the disparity. Id.
234. Id. at 40.
235. See, e.g., Michael Kirst, Secondary and Postsecondary Linkages, in ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
HIGHER EDUCATION 44 (Stacy Dickert-Conlin.& Ross Rubenstein eds., 2007).
236. See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON & MORTON OWEN SCHAPIRO, THE STUDENT AID GAME:
MEETING NEED AND REWARDING TALENT IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 47 (1998).
237. Id. at 14 (stating that the failure of student aid to keep pace with rising education costs has restricted
access of low-income students to higher education).
238. Kirst, supra note 236, at 44 (discussing factors that lead to subpar pre-college education of students
of color and the poor).
239. See, e.g., MCPHERSON & SCHAPIRO, supra note 237, at 47 (observing that "[1]ow-income students
are increasingly rare at four-year colleges and universities" due to increased education costs).
240. Edward P. St. John, The Impact of Financial Aid Guarantees on Enrollment and Persistence:
Evidence From Research on Indiana s Twenty-First Century Scholars and Washington State Achievers
Programs, in STATE MERIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS AND RACIAL INEQUALITY 125 (Donald E. Heller &
Patricia Marin eds., 2004), available at www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/meritaid/fullreport04.php
(arguing that millions of academically prepared, low income students are being denied educational
opportunities due to financial difficulty).
241. The Department of Education calculates cohort default rates for every college or university that
receives federal financial aid funds. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., COHORT DEFAULT RATE GUIDE, 2.1-1 (2006)
[hereinafter COHORT DEFAULT RATE]
http://ifap.ed.gov/DefaultManagement/guide/attachments/CDRGuideMasterSept06.pdf
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of individuals in the cohort.242 A cohort default rate above certain thresholds could
limit or eliminate a school's eligibility for federal student aid.243 Overall, cohort
default rates were 8.8% for fiscal year 2009, up from 7% in 2008.244 Predictably,
cohort default rates vary across institution type. The fiscal year 2009 rates were
7.2% for public institutions, 4.6% for private institutions, and almost 15% for for-
profit institutions.245 Default rates tend to increase over time, with those at for-
profit schools increasing at the highest rates among all institution types.246
C. "Gainful Employment" Rules
Other measures of repayment rates are also seen as proxies for determining the
extent to which an educational program is a good (or bad) investment. The ED has
implemented a highly controversial set of rules which rely, in part, on repayment
rates to determine whether an educational program is providing "gainful
employment" opportunities for students.247 The concept of gainful employment is
rooted in the consumer protection functions of the ED. All programs at for-profit
institutions and those lasting less than one year at public and private institutions
must "prepare students for gainful employment in a recognized occupation."248
Historically, this standard has been undefined, and therefore schools have not been
required to demonstrate compliance in any specific way.249 Repayment rates play a
central role in defining gainful employment and providing meaningful benchmarks
for assessing compliance. For example, one path to compliance requires programs
to have an aggregate loan repayment rate of at least 45%.250 Programs with
repayment rates below 35% may be deemed ineligible to receive federal financial
aid funds.251
As an alternative to the loan repayment benchmarks, the rules also provide
standards based on debt-to-income thresholds. Programs for which the typical
242. Id. at 2.1 (providing a detailed explanation of how cohort default rates are calculated, including an
alternate method for schools with less than 30 student loan borrowers in a cohort).
243. Id. at 2.4-3 (explaining the ramifications of having cohort default rates over 25% and 40%).
244. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIRECT LOAN AND FEDERAL FAMILY EDUCATION LOAN PROGRAMS,
INSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT RATE COMPARISON OF FY 2007, 2008, AND 2009 COHORT DEFAULT RATES (2011),
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/defaultmanagement/instrates.html.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., U.S. Gen Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, H. Subcomm. On Higher Education,
Lifelong Learning and Competitiveness, Proprietary Schools: Stronger Department Of Education Oversight
Needed to Help Ensure Only Eligible Students Receive Federal Student Aid (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09600.pdf (showing default rates over a 2-, 3-, and 4-year periods for various
program types).
247. See, e.g., Goldie Blumenstyk, Despite Criticism, Education Department Moves Ahead with 'Gainful
Employment'Rule, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 8, 2011, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Despite-
Criticism-Education/127425/. See generally, Program Integrity, supra note 200 (providing detailed
presentation of proposed regulations).
248. Program Integrity, supra note 200, at 112.
249. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 20 (explaining that "[tihe rate would be based on the total amount of loans repaid divided by
the original outstanding balance of all loans entering repayment in the prior four Federal fiscal years").
251. Id.at17.
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former student has student debt payments that are less than 8% of annual earnings
and less than 20% of discretionary income are deemed compliant with gainful
employment standards.252 On the other hand, programs with debt-to-income ratios
exceeding 12% of annual earnings or 30% of discretionary income would become
ineligible for federal student loan funding if their repayment rate is also below
35%. 253
The minimum standards set out by the gainful employment rules are policy
statements. The ED is saying that repayment rates below 35% and debt-to-income
ratios exceeding 12% of annual earnings or 30% of discretionary income represent
intolerable levels of investment failure. According to ED estimates, more than
255,000 students are enrolled in programs that would be rendered ineligible under
the gainful employment rules.254 In other words, more than a quarter million
students are at the greatest risk of investment failure, typified by high student loan
debt and difficulty paying it. The bulk of these students are enrolled in for-profit
schools,255 and unfortunately these schools are often criticized for questionable and
inappropriate enrollment practices.256
V. INFORMATION ASSYMETRY AS INVESTMENT FRAUD
Educational investment decisions are filled with wide-ranging uncertainty.
Individuals who decide to invest in education must choose among a dizzying array
of schools and programs. Compounding the inherent difficulties of this task is a
lack of reliable information regarding school quality or even programmatic
content.257 Worse yet, students are often unable to even ascertain the costs of their
educational investments beforehand, due to "complicated pricing structures". 258
The resulting information asymmetry between schools and students contributes to
what can be termed "bounded rationality"-circumstances where a rational person
makes an irrational decision.259 Irrational educational decisions, principally in the
form of bad school choices, often lead to education investment failure, and when
this failure is the result of deception, it is akin to investment fraud.
252. Id. at 44. See generally, id. at 35 (describing how loan debt and income are calculated).
253. Id. at 44.
254. Calculations by author. Id. at 54.
255. Of the 3,000 programs that would fall below ineligible thresholds, about 65% would be offered by
for-profit schools, 30% by public schools, and 5% by private schools. Id. at 68.
256. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 26, at 733 (describing the nature of misrepresentations and fraud in
higher education, particularly in the for-profit sector).
257. LONG, supra note 16, at I ("[W]ith little help families must sort through a complex menu of
postsecondary institutions that differ in terms of level, sector, and focus as well as costs, admissions
standards, and credentials and majors offered. Then they must put this information in perspective with their
own personal situations and preferences.").
258. Id.
259. See, e.g., Bryan D. Jones, Bounded Rationality, 2 ANNU. REv. POLIT. Sc. 298 (1999), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-smeunier/JonesBoundedl.pdf.
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A. Difficulty Obtaining Information
Choosing a school is a critical educational investment decision. When
choosing a school, a student is not only deciding from where she will hopefully
receive a diploma; she is also deciding the type of program she will undertake,
which determines the credential she receives and the minimum amount of time it
will take her to complete the program. Additionally, the choice of school can also
determine the student's chance of completion; the educational "undermatch"
phenomenon is an example of this. Researchers have found that low-income
students who enroll in the most selective institutions for which they are qualified
have a greater chance of completing their program than their peers who
undermatch.260 If more students were aware of the importance of school
characteristics, like selectivity, and if more students had access to useful
information about these characteristics, there would probably be less bounded
rationality among those who choose to invest in higher education.
The choice of school is often influenced by costs; however, many students lack
reliable information about education costs and financial aid. For example, about
850,000 students who would likely qualify for Pell grants do not even bother to
apply for them.261 Researchers tend to believe this trend results from a lack of
information, given the utter irrationality of these students-the neediest-not
pursuing such a favorable source of financial aid.262 Students also lack basic
awareness of financial concepts that are relevant to determining education costs. In
one study, only 27% of respondents could correctly answer basic questions about
interest rates, inflation, and investment risk diversification.263 Sociocconomic
factors influenced knowledge of these concepts.264 All these trends are troubling,
260. BAUM ET AL., supra note 30, at 41 ("'[U]ndermatching' is defined as having test scores and high
school grades that would make acceptance at a very selective state university very probable, but enrolling
instead at a less-selective institution.").
261. BURDMAN, supra note 17, at 4 ("Surprising numbers of low-income students-850,000 a year, or 26
percent, according to the American Council on Education- don't apply for federal aid at all, even though
they would likely qualify for Pell Grants.").
262. Id.
263. The researchers studied financial literacy among a nationally representative sample of 23-28 year
olds. The researchers posed three questions of basic financial literacy, testing knowledge of interest rates,
inflation, and investment risk diversification:
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 years, how much
do you think you would have in the account ifyou left the money to grow: more than $102, exactly $102, or
less than $102? (Do not know; refuse to answer)
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 10% per year and inflation was 2% per year. After
1 year, would you be able to buy more than, exactly the same as, or less than today with the money in this
account? (Do not know; refuse to answer)
Do you think that the following statement is true or false? "Buying a single company stock usually provides a
safer return than a stock mutual fund " (Do not know; refuse to answer)
Only 27% of respondents answered all three questions correctly, with 79% answering the interest rate
question correctly, 54% answering the inflation question correctly, and 47% answering the investment risk
diversification question correctly. ANNAMARIA LUSARDI ET AL., FINANCIALLY LITERATE AMONG THE
YOUNG: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMER POLICY (2010),
http://www.dartmouth.edu/-alusardi/Papers/Financial literacyyoung.pdf.
264. Id. at 12.
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given research suggesting that knowledge of education costs and financial aid
options influence college participation, college choice, and, in the end, college
completion. 265
B. Unscrupulous Practices
A particularly insidious manifestation of the information asymmetry is
deception and fraud. Some colleges, particularly those in the for-profit sector, have
been found to engage in deceptive and fraudulent practices in order to encourage
enrollment and, in the process, secure federal financial aid funds.266 This deception
is most often targeted at individuals who are most likely to be duped by it. 267
In 2010, a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) undercover
investigation of 15 for-profit schools found deceptive, if not fraudulent, enrollment
practices at all of them.268 The deception related to graduation rates, costs, and
post-employment employment prospects and salary-factors that are highly
relevant to anyone attempting to determine the prudence of an educational
269investment. For example, representatives at two colleges guaranteed
employment upon graduation and representatives at five colleges inflated
salaries.270 Additionally, at nine colleges, undercover investigators were given
deceptive information about program duration or costs.271 Representatives at six
colleges deceptively told investigators that they were required to enroll prior to
receiving information about financial aid eligibility.272 Representatives at four
colleges encouraged investigators to falsify financial aid documents.273 One
representative even told an undercover investigator that "student loans were not like
car loans because 'no one will come after you if you don't pay."'274 This
investigation highlighted the pervasive nature of deception and fraud in higher
education, as well as the informational disadvantage at which students often find
themselves.
For schools, there are few disincentives to engage in deceptive or fraudulent
behavior when enrolling students. The maximum fine imposed by the ED for a
"substantial" misrepresentation is only $25,000, 275 a nominal amount in the grand
265. See, e.g., id. at 8.
266. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-948T, FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES:
UNDERCOVER TESTING FINDS COLLEGES ENCOURAGED FRAUD AND ENGAGED IN DECEPTIVE AND
QUESTIONABLE MARKETING PRACTICES (2010) [hereinafter GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dl0948t.pdf.
267. Taylor, supra note 26, at 761 (asserting that "the most common targets of proprietary school
advertisements are poor, undereducated, and older" and thus "highly susceptible to being persuaded by
misrepresentations, due to their lack of insight about higher education").
268. GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 7.
269. Id. at 9.
270. Id. at 10.
271. Id. at 11.
272. Id.
273. The representatives' encouragement of this fraud was inexplicable, given that the investigators
presented an ability to pay for the programs without financial aid. Id. at 7.
274. Id. at 12.
275. GAO UNDERCOVER TESTING, supra note 266, at 6.
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scheme of things. ED can strip a school of its federal financial aid eligibility, but is
reluctant to pursue such sanctions, even when appropriate. 276  Making matters
worse, another GAO study found the ED's methods of detecting some forms of
noncompliance with financial aid rules to be inadequate.277 In addition, Federal
Student Aid (FSA), the division within ED that oversees federal student aid
programs, lists as a strategic priority the development of "compliance metrics" for
identifying schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent behavior;278 the
implication being that current measures are inadequate.
1. Few Avenues for Redress
Schools that engage in deceptive or fraudulent practices are protected by the
courts, mainly though the doctrine of academic abstention-a judicial "reluctance
to intrude upon the inner workings of [higher education] institutions."279 The
doctrine is a historical relic, tracing its existence to a time when colleges were
operated almost exclusively by churches.280 Courts were reluctant to intrude upon
the inner workings of the church, and this reluctance extended to schools, as arms
of the church.281 The doctrine, however, has persisted through the advent of public
colleges and universities and the secularization of most private schools. The
primary modem justification is premised on a judicially-held view that courtroom
fact-finders are unqualified to question the judgments of professional educators.282
Adherence to academic abstention disadvantages victims of higher education
deception and fraud who seek redress in the courts. Causes of action tend to be
based on tort or contract law theories. In tort law, fraudulent misrepresentation,
negligent misrepresentation, and educational malpractice are some of the most
common theories of recovery. In contract law, breach of contract is probably the
most common theory. In each, judicial reluctance or deference renders each theory
ineffective at gamering recovery for most plaintiffs.
Fraudulent misrepresentation is difficult to prove because scienter, or intent to
deceive, is difficult to prove. Typically, courts require high levels of specificity
when considering whether a misrepresentation is fraudulent.283 Negligent
276. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-10, HIGHER EDUCATION: STRONGER FEDERAL
OVERSIGHT NEEDED TO ENFORCE BAN ON INCENTIVE PAYMENTS TO SCHOOL RECRUITERS 33 (2010),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dlIlO.pdf ("Education officials also noted that they have not
terminated a school for incentive compensation issues. They were primarily concerned that schools would
challenge terminations and Education would need to invest resources in litigating cases without necessarily
prevailing in those terminations.").
277. See, e.g., id. at 2.
278. FSA STRATEGIC PLAN, supra note 133, at 21.
279. Taylor, supra note 26, at 763.
280. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for Litigating Educational Liability
Claims, 89 Nw. U.L. REv. 1768, 1812 (1995).
28 1. Id.
282. Taylor, supra note 26, at 763.
283. See, e.g., Schwitters v. Des Moines Commercial Coll., 203 N.W. 265, 265 (Iowa 1925)
(characterizing representations made regarding the timeline for course completion and post-graduation job
acquisition as "no more than a prophecy" and thus not actionable as a basis of recovery).
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misrepresentation is rendered mostly ineffective because "courts are reluctant to
impose a duty of care upon educational institutions for their student outcomes." 284
Courts have cited the collaborative nature of education in reasoning that there is no
objective standard of care that could be imposed upon schools.285 Courts have
rendered educational malpractice, another negligence-based theory, effectively
moot based on a host of considerations, including "inherent uncertainties" about the
causes of the harms being alleged and the potential for a flood of litigation that
could "overburden schools". 286 Montana is the only state where an educational
malpractice claim has been allowed to proceed.287
Courts require that breach of contract claims allege that specific promises were
broken,288 thus leaving effectively no path to recovery for plaintiffs who were
duped by "legally vague, but practically convincing" promises.289 And with a
seeming nod to academic abstention, one court articulated a standard that only those
contract claims that allow the court to make "an objective assessment" of whether
the institution broke a promise can stand; those that require the fact-finder to
consider "educational processes and theories" must be dismissed. 290
The information asymmetry that characterizes the relationship between schools
and students fosters bad educational choices and aids unscrupulous schools in
deception and fraud. Both trends contribute to investment failure, in the form of
failure to complete. Unfortunately, students who are victimized by lack of
information or deceptive misinformation are offered few options for redress. And
when these students leave school with crushing student loan debt, bankruptcy
represents only an inconsistent source of possible relief.
VI. BANKRUPTCY AS INCONSISTENT RELIEF
Currently, student loans are non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, unless the debtor
can prove that paying the debt would be an undue hardship upon him and his
dependents.291 Until the mid-1970s, however, student loans were dischargeable
like other forms of unsecured debt.292 The impetus behind restricting student loan
discharges was the image of an "about-to-be wealthy graduate of medical school or
law school" filing for bankruptcy before attempting to make any student loan
payments.293 These stories fostered a perception that the federal student loan
program was a boondoggle of sorts, with crafty students benefitting at the literal
284. Taylor, supra note 26, at 765.
285. See, e.g., Tolman v. CenCor Career Coll., 851 P.2d 203, 205 (Colo. App. 1992).
286. The other cited reasons for declining to recognize educational malpractice are familiar: lack of a
standard of care and a reluctance to "embroil the courts into overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools."
Ross v. Creighton, 957 F.2d 410,414 (7th Cir. 1992).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 416-17.
289. Taylor, supra note 26, at 767.
290. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417.
291. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006).
292. COMM'N REPORT 1997, supra note I1, at 207.
293. Id. at 209.
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expense of the taxpayers. The overall increase in bankruptcies likely fueled these
perceptions.
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws in
large part to study the causes of what the Commission termed "The Rising Tide of
Consumer Bankruptcies".294 The Commission studied allegations of abuse of
student loan discharges and found only limited, mainly anecdotal, evidence of such
abuse.295 It nonetheless found the abuse "reprehensible" and concluded that "it
poses a threat to the continuance of educational loan programs." 296  The
Commission then recommended that student loans be non-dischargeable during the
first five years after entering repayment, unless the debtor can prove an undue
hardship. 297  In 1976, Congress implemented the Commission's
recommendation.298 Since then, student loan discharge has been increasingly
restricted. In 1988, the five-year period of non-discharge was extended to seven
years.299 In 1998, the seven-year period was removed altogether, leaving an undue
hardship determination as the only path to a student loan discharge. 30 0
Inexplicably, Congress has failed to define undue hardship or provide any guidance
to judges in assessing each debtor's situation. This ambiguity fosters inconsistency
at practically every juncture in the process of seeking a student loan discharge.
A. Overview of Bankruptcy
Debt is vital to the U.S. economy, as such, so is bankruptcy. The relationship
between the two is akin to that of an electrical current and a circuit breaker.
Essentially, bankruptcy serves as a means of relieving pressure created by over-
indebtedness.30 This relief system is critical to the proper function of an economy
centered around consumption.302
The function of debt is to facilitate consumption. Debt allows for the
immediate costs of consumption to be shifted to a later time, when presumably
increased financial resources will allow the debtor to pay those costs.303 Student
loans illustrate this function in classic fashion. Students use loans to finance their
294. The Commission was made up of nine individuals appointed by the President of the U.S., the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The
Commission was charged with studying and proposing reforms to the bankruptcy system. See H.R. Doc. No,
93-137, at v, 1.
295. See id. at 176.
296. Id. at 176-77.
297. Id. at 177 ("The Commission, therefore recommends that, in the absence of hardship, educational
loans be nondischargeable unless the first payment falls due more than five years prior to the petition.").
298. COMM'N REPORT 1997, supra note I1, at 209.
299. Id. at 212.
300. Huey, supra note 4, at 101.
301. H.R, Doc. NO. 93-137 , at 61 ("[T]he 'bankruptcy act ... is designed to be a kind of safety valve for
the pressures generated by the conflicts which develop where the exchange of goods and services takes place
through multiple extensions of credit from a number of unconnected sources."').
302. A. Mechele Dickerson, Consumer Over-Indebtedness: A U.S. Perspective, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 135,
136 (2007) ("Americans are voracious consumers, but meager producers and savers.").
303. BETTI ET AL., STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF CONSUMER INDEBTEDNESS: STATISTICAL ASPECTS I
(2001), available at http://ec.europa.eulconsumers/cons int/fina serv/cons directive/fina serv06_en.pdf.
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current education consumption in hopes that their education will allow them a
future salary sufficient to pay off their student loans. Using debt in this manner can
be, and often is, prudent.304
When determining the prudency of taking on debt, rational consumers attempt
to account for future events, both expected and unexpected, that may frustrate their
ability to repay the debt.305 Unfortunately, not even the most conscientious debtor
can predict the future with certainty-and not every debtor is conscientious in the
first place. So over-indebtedness is inevitable,306 and when the pressures of over-
indebtedness become unmanageable, bankruptcy is the process through which a
debtor can receive relief. But in addition to relieving pressure on debtors,
bankruptcy protects creditors. 307  These dual purposes-relieving debtors and
protecting creditors-create "a system born of conflict and competing values". 308
Like over-indebtedness in the economy, conflict is unavoidable in bankruptcy. 309
1. History
The U.S. system of bankruptcy, with its dual concerns, is rather distinct in
history. Early bankruptcy laws originated in Europe and only applied to merchants
and commercial traders.310 Bankruptcy was an involuntary process, primarily
concerned with protecting creditors by ensuring that the assets of debtors,
particularly those deemed to be evading debt obligations, were liquidated and
distributed fairly. 3 Under these early laws, there was no discharge of unsatisfied
debts,312 and debtors were considered criminal "offenders." 313
The first bankruptcy law in the U.S. was promulgated in 1800 and was modeled
after the laws in Europe.314 However, the Act of 1841 fundamentally changed
bankruptcy law by allowing for a voluntary action and making it available to
304. Id. ("When given the opportunity and in the right circumstances, we can observe that many informed
consumers successfully use debt to shift expenditure from one period of their lives to another.").
305. Id. ("The rational consumer takes into consideration the possibility of future serious illness,
unemployment or other potential negative events when he/she makes decisions such as borrowing and makes
the necessary precautions, such as insurance, to the extent possible and appropriate.")
306. Id. at 2 ("[LJike indebtedness, over-indebtedness is a natural phenomenon that inevitably touches a
proportion of the population at any time and in any economic circumstances.").
307. See, e.g., H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 71.
308. COMM'N REPORT 1997, supra note I1, at 78.
309. Id. (asserting that bankruptcy "must remain unpopular and controversial" in order to serve its dual
purposes).
310. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 63 ("[Bankruptcy laws] germinated in the law-merchant of the Italian
states and elsewhere in continental Europe during the late Middle Ages as a weapon against a commercial
trader who 'made bankrupt' by flight from a mercantile center ... or .. .by concealment of his property.").
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Charles J. Tabb, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse or
Protection? The Top Twenty Issues in the History of Consumer Bankruptcy, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 9, 28 (2007)
(remarking that bankrupt debtors were often imprisoned and fraudulent bankrupt debtors could be put to
death).
314. Seeid.atll-12.
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individual and other non-merchant debtors.315 The voluntary action introduced a
largely unprecedented cooperative aspect to bankruptcy law.316 This cooperative
component was rooted in English insolvency law, which was premised on
providing a process by which an "unfortunate debtor" could liquidate his assets
among his creditors.317 In essence, the 1841 Act provided a means for a debtor,
recognizing his financial situation, to file bankruptcy on his own terms, rather than
at the behest of a creditor. The fundamental goal of bankruptcy-the liquidation
and apportionment of debtor assets to creditors-did not change; but the voluntary
nature of the process represented a fundamental "sea change."m The Act was
short-lived, as Congress repealed it after only thirteen months; but voluntary
bankruptcy became an enduring notion in future legislation.
The Act of 1898 was the first permanent federal bankruptcy law; the previous
three acts-1800, 1841, and 1867-were all temporary pieces of legislation.320
Debate over the bill lasted nine years,321 with debt discharge representing a primary
sticking-point.322 The law was based in large part on a fiercely pro-creditor bill
drafted by Senator Jay Torrey; however, pro-debtor factions were able to influence
the final bill in conference, and the result has been characterized as "one of the most
favorable pro-debtor relief measures ever enacted."323 The paramount form of
debtor relief-the discharge of debts-was included in the final bill. In fact, one
Senator called the discharge provisions "exceedingly liberal." 324
Like voluntary bankruptcy, debt discharge has persisted as a primary
component of bankruptcy law for more than 100 years. The enduring legacy of
debt discharge has been its role as the basis of a central objective of bankruptcy-
providing a debtor with a "fresh start". The premise of the fresh start was captured
by the Supreme Court in Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.:325 "to
relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit
him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes."326 In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,327 the Court characterized the
idea of a fresh start essentially as a means of integrating the bankrupt debtor back
into the economy as a productive wage-eamer. The Court stated that preserving the
315. H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 63.
316. In practice, cooperative bankruptcies were not completely unprecedented prior to the 1841 Act.
Creditors and debtors would sometimes enter "friendly", though still involuntary, bankruptcies. Id. at 64.
317. Id. at 63.
318. See Tabb, supra note 313, at 12.
319. Bradley Hansen, Bankruptcy Law in the United States, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (Aug. 14, 2001)
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/hansen.bankruptcy.law.us.
320. Charles Jordan Tabb, A Century of Regress or Progress? A Political History of Bankruptcy
Legislation in 1898 and 1998, 15 BANKR. DEv. J. 343, 344, 363 (1999) (describing the bill's permanency as
a radical idea at the time").
321. Id. at 354.
322. Id. at 368.
323. Id. at 367.
324. Id. at 376.
325. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915).
326. Id. at 554-55.
327. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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right of the debtor to exit bankruptcy with "a new opportunity in life and a clear
field for future effort"328 was "of the utmost importance . . . because it is a
fundamental private necessity [and] a matter of great public concern." 329
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 replaced the 1898 legislation.330 One of
the primary aims of the new Act was to steer bankrupt debtors away from filing
under Chapter 7 and into Chapter 13.331 The idea behind this encouragement was a
belief that creditors would get paid more through Chapter 13 payments plans than
they were under Chapter 7 liquidation.332 Unwilling to infringe upon debtor
freewill, Congress stopped short of compelling certain debtors into Chapter 13;
rather it provided incentives for such a filing.333 This policy decision demonstrated
that the voluntary nature of bankruptcy remained a very important ideal. However,
suspicion remained that some debtors who could afford to pay some of their debts
through Chapter 13 were nonetheless filing for the broader discharge under Chapter
7. And in 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act 334
passed.
The signature feature of the 2005 Act was a long-held priority of the credit
industry335 - a "means test" that debtors must pass in order to file under Chapter
7.336 The means test has been criticized as being sloppily written;337 but, very
generally, if a debtor's income is above the applicable median income for similar
households in his state, he must show that his disposable income falls below $100
per month or $6,000 over a five-year period.338 While very few debtors are forced
into Chapter 13 by the means test, 339 the fact that Congress was willing to infringe,
even a little, upon the debtor sanctity of choosing under which Chapter to file is
significant.
328. Id. at 244.
329. Id. at 245.
330. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History Of The Bankruptcy Laws In The United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995).
331. Seeid.at35.
332. Id.
333. Id. (citing "super discharge" of certain debts that would not be dischargeable in Chapter 7 as an
inducement for filing Chapter 13); see also id. at 36 (remarking that Congress granted courts the power to
dismiss Chapter 7 filings that amounted to "substantial abuse" of the system, meaning it was very clear that
the debtor could afford to pay some of his debts).
334. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23 (2005).
335. COMM'N REPoRT 1997, supra note 11, at 90 (noting in 1997 that"[t~he credit industry has sought
means testing consistently for at least 30 years").
336. Dickerson, supra note 212, at 939.
337. See, e.g., Chelsey W. Tulis, Get Real: Reframing the Debate over How to Calculate Projected
Disposable Income in § 1325(b), 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 345, 358, 360 (2009) (describing how "confusing"
language has led to conflicting interpretations of the means test).
338. See Dickerson, supra note 212, at 939 (providing a detailed explanation of the means test).
339. Michelle J. White, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the 2005 Act: Abuse or
Protection? Economics of Bankruptcy Reform under BAPCPA, 2007 U.ILL. L. REV. 275, 291 (2007)
(calculating that less than 1% of bankrupt debtors were forced into Chapter 13 because of the means test). See,
also, e.g., Christian E. Weller et al., Estimating the Effect of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of2005 on the Bankruptcy Rate, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 327 (2010) (noting that while the Chapter
7 filing rate decreased after passage of the 2005 Act, this decrease was likely temporary).
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Some of the most recent bankruptcy reforms were hastened by precipitous
increases in the number of bankruptcy filings. The 1970 Commission noted that
between 1946 and 1967, the total number of bankruptcies increased from 10,196 to
208,329, with 191,729 being personal bankruptcies.340 The work of this
Commission influenced the 1978 Act.341 A second Commission, formally titled the
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, was established in 1994,342 largely in
response to the 1.2 million personal bankruptcies that year. So in the less than 30
years between the two Commissions, the number of personal bankruptcies
increased more than six-fold. In 2010, there were more than 1.5 million personal
bankruptcies, 34 3 the highest amount since the record 2 million in 2005. 34
As the number of bankruptcies has risen, Congress has excepted an increasing
number of debt types from discharge. When a debt is excepted from discharge, it
survives bankruptcy, and the debtor remains responsible for paying it. Thus,
discharge exceptions are direct infringements upon the notion of a fresh start. Pre-
1978, discharge was essentially an all-or-nothing proposition; the 1978 Act
included nine discharge exceptions; the 2005 Act includes nineteen. 345 Some debts
are excepted based on public policy reasons; for instance, debt incurred through
346fraud cannot be discharged. Other debts are excepted due to "the inherent nature
of the obligation". 347 One such excepted debt is student loans. The oft-espoused
"inherent nature" justification is that the viability of the student loan program
depends on debtors making good on their obligations.348
B. Undue Hardship Standard
Bankruptcy courts have struggled with the mere definition of undue hardship.
Should the words be construed literally or conceptually? Should the words be
defined separately or together? The In re Heckathorn court stated that undue
hardship was a "phrase with a particular legal meaning and function". 349
Conversely, the In re Skaggs court reasoned that "the plain, ordinary meaning" of
the words was sufficient in taking a "common sense" approach to defining the
concept.350
Some courts seem to struggle with determining the extent or degree of hardship
that should be embedded in their definitions, suggesting that "undue" is the more
340. COMMISsION REPORTI973, supra note 9, at 2.
341. COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at ii.
342. Id. at 47.
343. U.S. BANKRUPTY COURTS-BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS CASES COMMENCED BY CHAPTER OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2010 t. F-2 (2011)
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2010/1210 f2.pdf.
344. The number of bankruptcies in 2005 was likely inflated by debtors clamoring to file just before the
new, more restrictive, bankruptcy laws took effect in October of that year. Dickerson, supra note 302, at 148.
345. Tabb, supra note 330, at 7.
346. COMMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note I1, at 179.
347. Id.
348. See, e.g., In re Claxton, supra note 3, at 568.
349. In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 194.
350. In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 867.
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problematic component of the concept. The In re Brunner court stated that
"garden-variety" hardships are not "undue." 35' The court suggested that undue
hardship required a "certainty of hopelessness" about a debtor's ability to fulfill her
payment obligations. 3 52 In contrast, the court in Kopf v. Dep 't of Educ.3 5 3 stated
that a "certainty of hopelessness" standard is antithetical to the fresh start ideal;
thus, it applied a standard that only required debtors to show a "reasonable" chance
that paying their loan would force them to live below a "minimal standard of
living."354 Frustrated by the ambiguous standards and thresholds applied in undue
hardship cases, the In re Bryant court tied undue hardship to federal poverty
guidelines-an objective benchmark.35 5 According to the court, if a debtor's net
income is "at, near or below" the poverty rate or if a debtor's income is above the
rate, but she has sufficiently "unique" or "extraordinary" expenses, the payments
represent an undue hardship.356 So the degree of hardship required by courts has
ranged from "reasonable" to "certain" and has been tied to poverty rates.
Most courts agree that in order for a hardship to be "undue," it must persist into
the future. The Heckathorn court stated that in addition to demonstrating current
inability to pay, debtors are expected "to show also that they cannot reasonably be
expected to make payments.. .in the foreseeable future." 35' The In re Coleman
court characterized the debtor's threshold burden as proving "that he does not now,
and will not in the future, have the funds available from which to repay the student
loan."358 However, the Skaggs court, with its plain meaning approach, reasoned
that current inability to pay, by itself, could represent an undue hardship.359
1. Tests
Some courts have devised multi-faceted tests essentially to detect an undue
hardship when considering a debtor's case.
351. In re Brunner, 46 B.R., at 753.
352. Id. at 755.
353. 245 B.R. 731 (Bankr. D. Me. 2000)
354. Id. at 745.
355. Bryant v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Bryant), 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1987) ("We feel that such a test will decrease, if not eliminate, the resort to the unbridled subjectivity
which seems to pervade many of the decisions in [undue hardship cases].").
356. Id.
357. In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 193.
358. Coleman v. Higher Educ. Assistance Foundation (In re Coleman), 98 B.R. 443, 451 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 1989).
359. In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 868.
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a. Brunner
The most popular test was devised by the Brunner court.360 The Brunner test
requires debtors seeking a student loan discharge to show the following three
things:
1) that the debtor cannot, based on current income and expenses,
maintain a "minimal" standard of living for himself or herself and his or her
dependents if forced to repay the loans, 2) that this state of affairs is likely to
persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loan,
and 3) that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. 361
In essence, the test requires debtors to show that their loan payments would
require them to sacrifice basic necessities, both presently and for a number of years
in the future, and that they have made reasonable attempts to repay the debt. The
subjectivity and ambiguity are apparent, even in this truncated explanation. What is
a "minimal standard of living"? 362 How is inability to pay for "a significant portion
of the repayment period" predicted?363 What constitutes "good faith efforts"? 364
These are all questions that remain unclear because undue hardship remains
undefined.
b. Johnson
Some courts have chosen to adopt the test devised by the In re Johnson
court.365 Under this test, debtors are required to pass an "undue hardship" test that
accounts for their current and future sources of income and their expenses.366
Debtors must show, given their expenses, their income is insufficient to meet their
loan obligations. Their expenses must be "reasonable" in order to pass scrutiny.
Debtors who pass the undue hardship test must then pass either a "good faith" test
or a "policy" test. The Johnson good faith test requires debtors to have made
attempts to repay the loan; in making this assessment, the test looks at debtor
attempts at finding employment, minimizing expenses, and maximizing income.3
If a debtor fails the good faith test, the court will apply a policy test. The purpose
of the policy test is to assess whether granting the discharge would represent an
360. Nine judicial circuits have adopted the Brunner test. State Univ. New York-Student Loan Service
Center et al. v. Menezes, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65464 (D. Mass. 2006).
361. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. at 756.
362. Rafael 1. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge
Litigation, 83 Am. BANKR. L.J. 179, 197 (2009) ("The doctrine fails to set forth even the rough contours of
how to engage in a substantive evaluation of income and expenses.. Instead, the doctrine merely confirms
that courts have free rein to infuse subjectivity into what should be a straightforward financial calculation.").
363. Id. at 198 (describing attempts by the Ninth Circuit to apply objective factors to determine future
inability to pay, but lamenting that a "multifactor test within a multifactor test" is not "a realistic way to
accomplish consistent results.").
364. Id. at 200 ("Given the inherent subjectivity in an amorphous standard such as good faith, any efforts
to clarify its meaning will probably create mischief rather than produce clarity.").
365. 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 (D. Pa. 1979)
366. This test is also referred to as the "mechanical" test. Id. at 35.
367. Id.at3l.
368. Id.at44.
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abuse of the bankruptcy laws.369 This assessment hinges largely on the percentage
of the debtor's total debt that is made up of student loans. 370 The higher the
percentage, the more likely courts will view a discharge as abusive. The test also
considers the financial benefit the debtor has received from her education.
Debtors who have received little or no benefit are more likely to have their loans
discharged.
In summary, the Johnson test requires debtors to first demonstrate that their
current income is insufficient to make loan payments and this insufficiency will
persist. They must also show that their expenses are reasonable. They must then
show either that they have made diligent attempts to pay the loans by maximizing
income and minimizing expenses or that they have received little financial benefit
from their education and discharging student loans is not their overwhelming reason
for filing bankruptcy. Like Brunner, critical elements of the Johnson test are based
on ambiguous concepts.
c. Bryant
The least popular test is the most objective. As stated earlier, the In re Bryant
court attempted to devise an objective test by tying undue hardship to net income
and poverty benchmarks. In an effort to minimize subjective "moral judgments",
the court assumes pre-bankruptcy good faith on the part of debtors. 372 But the
process of determining net income can be knotty when a debtor is claiming unique
or extraordinary expenses; creditors can challenge the uniqueness or
extraordinariness of these expenses.3 73 But of all the tests, the Bryant test makes
the most explicit effort to base undue hardship determinations on an objective
measure.
d. Totality of the Circumstances
Some courts eschew reliance on tests altogether. These courts tend to take a
"totality of the circumstances" approach to making undue hardship determinations.
Recognizing that there was no "universally accepted" test of undue hardship, 374 the
Coleman court stated "rigid adherence.. .to a particular test robs the court of the
discretion envisioned by Congress" in devising the undue hardship standard.375
The court further stated that "[a]n undefined and illusive concept such as 'undue
hardship' should result from a fact-sensitive analysis based on the totality of the
circumstances."376 As a result, the court adopted a nine-prong test that assessed the
debtor's revenue and expenses; past job history; rate of pay; skills and education;
maximization of income; prudence of expenses; cause of insolvency; any medical
369. Id. at 52.
370. Id. at 54.
371. Id. at 55.
372. In re Bryant, 72 B.R at 918.
373. Id. at 919.
374. In re Coleman, 98 B.R. at 448.
375. Id. at 451.
376. Id.
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problems; and any dependents. 377
The Kopf court adopted a three-prong test that assessed a debtor's past, present,
and future income; his living expenses; and other relevant factors, such as medical
problems. In eschewing the prevailing tests, that court reasoned that Johnson and
Brunner "[tested] too much", specifically good-faith (in the case of both tests) and
policy (in the case of Johnson).3 78 Oddly, Bryant was disregarded not on its merits,
but because few other courts had adopted it.379  Substantively, the Kopf and
Coleman totality approaches are very similar; the primary difference is how factors
are categorized. In Kopf, "other circumstances" acts as a catchall capturing many
of the factors that Coleman specifically enumerates. 380 The problem with both
approaches is that they embrace the subjectivity and moral judgments that lead to
inconsistent undue hardship determinations.
2. Relief
The ambiguity of the undue hardship standard has fostered another area of
inconsistency: undue hardship relief. Three approaches have emerged when
determining appropriate relief when undue hardship is found: full discharge, partial
discharge, and "hybrid" discharge. Unfortunately, Congress has failed to provide
clarity, and therefore courts continue to grapple with this issue.
a. Full Discharge
Courts that view undue hardship relief as a full, all-or-nothing, proposition
typically base their approach on what they view as the plain language of the statute.
For example, the Skaggs court reasoned that the plain-meaning definition of "debt"
in the Bankruptcy Code encompasses the entire debt, not some part.381 According
to the court, Congress could have used language authorizing partial discharge, but
chose not to do so, 382 and "courts are not granted power to remedy perceived
defects in legislation."383
b. Partial Discharge
Courts that grant partial discharges base their approach on the equity function
of bankruptcy and their interpretation of Congressional intent. The Heckathorn
court emphasized that the bankruptcy process is "embedded in equity;"384 as such,
courts are allowed, if not required, to grant partial discharges where appropriate.
The court also reasoned that because "[tlhe words 'undue hardship' suggest a
matter of degree", viewing discharge from an all-or-nothing perspective would lead
377. Id.
378. Kopf, supra note 7, at 741.
379. Id. at 737.
380. Examples include medical problems and dependents. Id. at 746.
381. In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 866.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 867.
384. In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 194.
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to "absurd" results, in light of Congress's goals of providing fresh starts and
maximizing student loan payments.3s5 In essence, discharging loans to the extent
that they represent an undue hardship-and no more-will result in debtors getting
the relief Congress intended while ensuring that they still pay what they can.
The Skaggs court characterized the arguments in favor of partial discharges
thus: Courts that only grant full discharges reward "irresponsible debtors who
create their own hardship by borrowing excessively and unrealistically for their
education, while punishing the debtor who has borrowed more frugally and for
whom, therefore, repayment is not an 'undue hardship."'386 As the arguments goes,
all-or-nothing approaches incentivize excessive student loan indebtedness. The
Skaggs court concluded, however, that such arguments were "better made to
Congress than to the courts."387
c. Hybrid Discharge
The hybrid discharge approach is essentially an amalgamation of the full and
partial discharge approaches. Courts that grant hybrid discharge agree that the
plain-language of the undue hardship standard does not allow for partial discharge
of aggregate student loan debt.388 But these courts also agree that bankruptcy is an
equity process and all-or-nothing discharges may not adequately serve this
function.389 Hybrid courts resolve these seemingly contradictory views by
reasoning that while aggregate debt cannot be partially discharged, individual loans
making up that aggregation can be discharged as necessary to prevent undue
hardship. 390 In other words, if a debtor has multiple student loans (as is often the
case), some of those loans can be discharged while others can be deemed non-
dischargeable. In fact, hybrid courts reason that treating separate debts collectively
runs afoul of the plain language of the undue hardship statute.391
The In re Grigas court determined which of the debtor's fifteen loans were
dischargeable by first determining that $224 was the maximum monthly student
loan payment the debtor could make without experiencing undue hardship. 392The
court then considered each loan in chronological order, oldest to newest, to
ascertain whether it could be paid in full within 15 years, using $224 per month as
the original benchmark.393  Through this process, as loans are deemed fully
payable, and therefore non-dischargeable, the monthly amount is adjusted
accordingly, leaving less money to pay later loans. 394 For example, if Loan #1 was
fully payable in 15 years at $100 per month, Loan #2 would have to be payable in
15 years at no more than $124 per month in order to be non-dischargeable. If a loan
385. Id. at 196.
386. In re Skaggs, 196 B.R. at 866.
387. Id. at 867.
388. In re Grigas, 252 B.R. at 872.
389. Id. at 873.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 876.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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is too large to be fully repaid, that loan would be discharged and later loans would
be considered until the maximum monthly allotment is depleted.395 This method
advantages older loans and smaller loans.
3. Empirical Studies
An empirical study of student loan discharge cases confirmed that the
ambiguity of the undue hardship standard resulted in inconsistent decisions.
Researchers reviewed undue hardship determinations rendered between October 7,
1993 and October 6, 2003.396 In total, the researchers reviewed 286 determinations,
representing every federal circuit and 70% of the federal districts. 397  The
researchers found that 57% of the debtors were granted some form of undue
hardship relief.398 When the researchers compared the group that received relief to
the group that did not, they found an "overall lack of dissimilarity"399 -meaning
the two groups were virtually identical in relevant ways. For example, the
researchers found no statistically significant difference in the median monthly
disposable household income,400 median levels of student loan debt, or median
debt-to household ratios of the two groups.401 The researchers did find an
association between health problems and the granting of undue hardship relief, but
concluded that the existence of health problems alone could not explain why some
debtors received relief and others did not.402 As such, the researchers concluded
that "problems of uncertainty and unequal treatment of debtors" were rife in undue
hardship cases, "[undermining] the integrity of the system by producing haphazard
results." 4
03
Another study by the same researchers found that the extent of undue hardship
relief was based on factors other than those relevant to debtors' ability to repay their
loans. The researchers studied 115 undue hardship proceedings that had been
commenced between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2006 and resolved by
August 2007.404 They chose to base their study in the Western District of
Washington because it "appears to be a microcosm of the rest of the nation." 405 In
395. Id.
396. Rafael 1. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: An Empirical
Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 405, 434 (2005).
397. Id. at 437.
398. Id. at 479 (describing relief as being "in the form of full discharge, partial discharge, or equitable
adjustment [e.g. abatement of accrual of interest, deferment of payment]").
399. Id. at 481.
400. Id. at 483.
401. Id.at484.
402. Id. at 485 ("While an association certainly exists between (1) the poor health of the debtor and/or the
poor health of the debtor's dependents and (2) the grant of discharge... that association alone does not explain
the outcome in the undue hardship cases we have analyzed.").
403. Id. at 520.
404. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 362, at 203.
405. The researchers cited the Western District's higher education attainment, percentage of college
graduates with student loan debt, and bankruptcy filing rate to illustrate how the District's demographics are
similar to those of the nation. Id. at 201.
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57% of the 115 cases, debtors received some form of undue hardship relief.406 A
quarter of debtors who received relief were granted full discharges; half were
granted discharges of about 71%.407 The average discharge was 62%.408 The
researchers identified five determinants of the extent of discharge.409 Three of the
five determinants were counsel's years of experience; the identity of the judge
assigned to the case; and whether the case was settled or went to trial.410 These are
all factors that should be irrelevant to determining the merits of an undue hardship
case; however, they make up a majority of the factors that determine undue
hardship relief.
These findings provide compelling support for a new framework for
determining the propriety of student loan bankruptcy discharges. This framework
should be unambiguous and objective, thereby lending consistency to student loan
discharge cases.
VII. DEBT SERVICE THRESHOLDS AS OBJECTIVE BENCHMARKS
This section will present a framework for using debt service thresholds to
determine the propriety of federal student loan bankruptcy discharges. The
framework is centered around debt service thresholds because they provide critical,
albeit less than absolute, objectivity to a process that is woefully subjective. The
goals of the framework are two-fold: 1) to provide an impartial, economical, and
uniform means of assessing the propriety of student loan discharges, and 2) to
provide debtors facing crushing student loan debt and few prospects for repaying it
with a simplified avenue of relief in bankruptcy.
The 1994 Bankruptcy Commission lamented the "luck-of-the-draw justice"
endemic of bankruptcy litigation.411 The Commission noted that throughout its
review it heard complaints from debtors and creditors alike regarding inconsistency
and subjectivity across the system.4 12  Before that, the 1970 Bankruptcy
Commission observed that the "lack of uniform standards creates many variations
in district court practices, and they, in turn, cause unequal treatment of creditors and
debtors.,413 That Commission also identified four objectives of the administration
of bankruptcy laws. 414 Three of the four-impartiality, economy, and uniformity-
406. Id. at 213.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 229.
410. The other two determinants were the "aggregate factor count" (a cumulative measure of indicator
variables designed by the researchers) and the amount of student loan debt for which discharge was being
sought. Id.
411. COMMiSSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 81.
412. Id. ("From the first hearing, the Commission heard from both debtors and creditors that some
determinations that should apply consistently throughout the system have been left to individual judges and
trustees.").
413. COMMissioN REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 3.
414. "There should be four objectives in the administration of the bankruptcy process: impartial, expert,
and speedy performances of decision-making and other functions necessary to bring a case to a fruitful
conclusion; economy that avoids waste, duplication, dilatoriness, an inefficiency; uniformity in case
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are frustrated by inconsistency and subjectivity. As such, bankruptcy laws should
be clear, allowing for fair, efficient, and consistent resolution of cases.
Simplicity is an essential component of any rule intent on fostering consistent
results. As argued by the 1994 Commission, "[a] relatively simple standard reduces
litigation costs while it increases the predictability of outcomes. . .A simple
standard also promotes consistency in application among different judges and
different districts, increasing the likelihood that similar cases will be analyzed using
similar legal principles."415 The 1970 Commission tied simplicity to access to
bankruptcy. It warned that the cost of bankruptcy litigation "is often
disproportionate to the amounts of money involved," resulting in "genuine
controversies" being left unresolved.416 This point is important because many
commentators have argued that "[t]he borrowers most likely to prevail [in
bankruptcy] are those with the least possibility of being able to litigate the
question."417 As a result, the 1970 Commission concluded that "substantive laws,
procedural rules, and administrative practices should be simplified and clarified to
permit broader debtor, creditor, and counselor participation [in the bankruptcy
process]."4 8 Accordingly, "elaborate adjudication should be the exception, not the
rule." 419
As discussed earlier, the fresh start notion and the post-bankruptcy discharge of
debts are integral components of bankruptcy law. However, the subjective and
restrictive nature of the undue hardship standard renders these integral notions
needlessly speculative for debtors facing crushing student loan debt and few
prospects for repaying it. The following proposed framework represents an
impartial, economical, uniform and simplified alternative to the undue hardship
standard.
A. Proposed Framework
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in a
bachelor's degree (or lower) program:
* The debtor must have been in repayment for at least five years.
In order to be eligible for discharge of federal student loans obtained in a
graduate or professional school program:
* The debtor must have been in repayment for at least ten years.
In addition, the following criteria would apply to all debtors seeking federal
student loan discharge:
* The debtor must have participated in the federal Income-Based
Repayment (IBR) Plan or a similar plan for at least three years for all
procedure and in the application of substantive laws throughout the United States; and managerial flexibility
that can adjust quickly and efficiently to changes in quantity, kind, size, and location of cases." Id. at 81.
415. COMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 248.
416. COMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 82.
417. COMISSION REPORT 1997, supra note 11, at 212.
418. COMISSION REPORT 1973, supra note 9, at 76.
419. Id. at 82.
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student loans for which discharge is being sought.
* The debtor's Standard monthly payment amount (aggregated over the
year) must have been above applicable maximum debt service
thresholds for five consecutive years leading up to discharge.
Upon discharge of student loans:
* The debtor is ineligible to receive future federal student loans, unless
discharged loans are reaffirmed.
1. Mandatory Repayment Periods
As the Heckathorn court stated, some level of debt-induced hardship is to be
expected early in one's post-college career.420 As such, the purpose of the
mandatory repayment periods is to allow debtors an opportunity to realize some
benefit from their education and to make loan payments before resorting to
bankruptcy. The mandatory repayment periods would be exclusive of grace
periods, deferments, forbearances, and any other periods during which the debtor is
not required to make payments. The time periods can be non-consecutive.
The five-year mandatory repayment period for bachelor's degree (or lower)
program debtors is borrowed from the original recommendation by the 1970
Commission that was later adopted by Congress in 1976. The ten-year mandatory
repayment period for graduate and professional school program debtors mirrors the
length of the Standard repayment period for federal loans.421
The purpose of the longer mandatory repayment period for graduate and
professional school debtors is to allow them ample time to realize a payoff from
their education before seeking discharge. As discussed earlier, wages for workers
with graduate or professional degrees exceed those associated with lower levels of
education, and those wages have increased very robustly over the last 30 years.
Moreover, economic trends suggest that these workers will have an increasing
advantage in the scrum for stable, well-paying employment going forward.
BLS projects that through 2020, job growth will be greatest in occupations that
require a master's degree, followed by those requiring a doctoral or professional
degree.422 Thus, a longer mandatory repayment period for these debtors is
reasonable, given the favorable employment prospects afforded highly educated
individuals in this country. And to the extent that the solvency of the federal
student loan program would be threatened by this framework, debtors in the best
position to leverage their education in the job market should be encouraged to make
payments on their loans, even if through an income-based plan.
420. In re Heckathorn, 199 B.R. at 193.
421. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 25.
422. BLS makes the following 2010-2020 projections (in order of intensity): Master's degree: 21.7%,
Doctoral or professional degree: 19.9; Associate's degree: 18%; Some college: 17.5%; Postsecondary
certificate: 16.9%; Bachelor's degree: 16.5%; Less than high school: 14.1%; and High school diploma/GED:
12.2%. Overall job growth is projected to be 14.3%. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS: 2010-20 (2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecopro.pdf.
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2. Participation in Income-Based Repayment Plan
The requirement that debtors participate in a federally-sponsored income-based
repayment plan for at least three years is intended to ensure that debtors take
advantage of options other than bankruptcy before seeking discharge. By reducing
the debtor's monthly payment, such plans may be effective at directing debtors
away from bankruptcy.
Currently, the federal government offers three income-based student loan
repayment plans: Income-Based Repayment (IBR) Plan; Income Contingent
Repayment (ICR) Plan; and Income-Sensitive Repayment Plan.423 IBR is the
broadest of the plans, with applicability to all types of federal student loans,424
rendering the other plans virtually obsolete. Through [BR, debtors are required to
pay no more than 10% of their "disposable income"-defined as the difference
between their Adjusted Gross Income and 150% of the poverty level.425  The
difference between payments made under the Standard plan and the IBR Plan can
be significant for some debtors, with the latter being lower.426 Monthly payments
are adjusted each year based on the debtor's family and financial situation, and after
20 years, any remaining loan balance is canceled.427
3. Maximum Debt Service Thresholds
Debt service thresholds will be used to determine whether a debtor's student
loan payments are high enough to warrant discharge. Debt service, often expressed
as a percentage, is essentially a measure of indebtedness.428 Unfortunately, there is
no universally agreed upon definition or numerical threshold of over-
indebtedness.429 Thus, defining what constitutes excessive debt is an inherently
arbitrary exercise. With that said, however, there are generally accepted
benchmarks that are relied upon by loan underwriters and others who seek to assess
loan risks.430 And while these benchmarks are not applicable to every debtor's
situation, they are nonetheless helpful at providing common bases upon which to
assess a range of debtors.
The maximum debt service thresholds for this framework were set using as
guidance a model developed by researchers at the College Board. The College
423. Id. at 26 (providing an overview of all the income-based repayment plans and the types of loans to
which they apply).
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, INCOME-BASED REPAYMENT PLAN, available at
http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWebApp/students/english/IBRPlanjsp (providing an example of a debtor
whose payments under IBR would be less than half of Standard payments).
427. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 26.
428. See, e.g., BAUM & SCHWARTZ, supra note 111.
429. BETTI ET AL., supra note 303, at 59 ("[Tlhere is currently no general agreement on the appropriate
concepts of consumer indebtedness, on how to measure it or on where to draw the line between normal and
excessive / over-indebtedness.").
430. See, e.g., BAUM & SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 2 (describing the commonly-cited view that
student loan payments should not encumber more than 8% of gross income).
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Board model uses income levels and the poverty rate to determine the maximum
annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student loan payments.431 The model
determines maximum annual student loan payments by applying a uniform debt
service of 20% to an individual's "disposable income"---defined as income above
432150% of the poverty threshold.
The framework proposed in this article is less generous than the College Board
model. Maximum debt service thresholds begin at 20% and reach as high as 30%
of a debtor's disposable income. This graduated approach acknowledges, albeit
somewhat arbitrarily, that individuals "with higher incomes can afford to devote a
higher proportion of their incomes to debt payments without sacrificing basic
expenditures.A 33 In addition, the College Board's threshold is intended to be a
prudency standard, not necessarily a measure of when bankruptcy discharge is
appropnate.
The maximum annual amount a debtor can dedicate to student loan payments is
calculated in the following manner:
* Determine "disposable income" by calculating the difference between
the debtor's gross income and 150% of the federal poverty threshold
for similarly-situated debtors. 4 34 Gross income is defined as income
from all sources, including employment and domestic support. If the
debtor is married and not separated, spouse's income is also included
in the gross income calculation.
* The following student loan debt service thresholds are then applied to
the disposable income calculation:
$1-49,999 (disposable income): 20% (debt service threshold)
$50,000-74,999: 22.5%
$75,000-99,999: 25%
$100,000-124,999: 27.5%
$125,000+: 30%
So a debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of three (including
the debtor herself) will have disposable income of $12,205-which is the difference
between the debtor's gross income and 150% of the poverty threshold ($27,795) for
her family. The applicable student loan debt service threshold is 20 0 -which
means that for purposes of her bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this
debtor could dedicate to student loan payments for the year in question is $2,441, or
6% of her gross income. Student loan obligations above that amount would render
the payments, in effect, an undue hardship for that year.
431. Id. at 11.
432. Id. at 12.
433. Id. at 11.
434. The U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services publishes poverty guidelines each year. Poverty
thresholds are based principally on the number of persons in a family. For example, the poverty threshold for
a 4-person family in the 48 contiguous states and DC is $22,350; the threshold is $14,710 for a 2-person
family. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 76 Fed. Reg. 13 (Jan. 20, 2011), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/l I fedreg.pdf.
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Higher gross income or smaller family size can lead to higher maximum annual
student loan payments. For example, a debtor with gross income of $60,000 and a
family size of three would have disposable income of $32,205 ($60,000 - $27,795).
The applicable student loan debt service threshold is 20%-which means that for
purposes of his bankruptcy petition, the maximum amount this debtor could
dedicate to student loan payments for the year in question is $6,441, or about 11%
of his gross income.
A debtor with gross income of $40,000 and a family size of one would have
disposable income of $23,665 ($40,000 - $16,335). The applicable student loan
debt service threshold is 20%-which means that for purposes of her bankruptcy
petition, the maximum amount this debtor could dedicate to student loan payments
for the year in question is $4,733, or about 12% of her gross income.
4. Five Years of Above-Maximum Payments
In order to be eligible for discharge, the debtor's monthly payments
(aggregated over the year) must exceed the stipulated maximum amounts for five
consecutive years. Calculations will be made for each relevant year to account for
changes in salary, poverty thresholds, and payment obligations.
The Standard repayment plan will be used to determine payment obligations,
even if the debtor made payments under an income-based plan. The proposed
framework requires debtors to enroll in such a plan, in order to lower their monthly
payments. But relying on these lower payments in determining eligibility for
discharge would essentially punish the debtor. Thus, reliance on the Standard plan
(which represents the maximum most debtors can be obligated to pay) is premised
on the idea that debtors should not be punished for attempting to lower their
payments and exhaust options short of discharge.
Further, an income-based repayment plan should not be considered a substitute
for bankruptcy discharge. One court argued that such a consideration allows judges
to abdicate their responsibility of determining appropriate bankruptcy relief.435
Additionally, adherence to an income-based repayment plan can yield a non-
dischargeable tax obligation for the debtor. For example, after 20 years of making
payments through the IBR Plan, any remaining loan balance is canceled; but the
debtor may be required to report this canceled balance as taxable income.436 As the
Bronsdon court put it, debtors should not be forced to trade "a non-dischargeable
student loan debt for a non-dischargeable tax debt."437
Debtors with multiple loans can choose on which loans to seek discharge;
however, loans must be discharged in chronological order, from newest to oldest.
The latter restriction is an intuitive response to the ordinal manner in which degrees
435. Denittis v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Denittis), 362 BR. 57, 64 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) ("To
hold that debtors must participate in [an income-based repayment plan], if eligible, would be no more than the
Court abdicating its responsibility to determine the dischargeability of a student loan. If this is the outcome
Congress intended, it would have said so".).
436. MANAGE YOUR DEBT, supra note 140, at 26.
437. Bronsdon v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Bronsdon), 435 B.R. 791, 803 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 2010).
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are earned, and means that in all but the rarest cases, debtors with graduate or
professional school loans will have to successfully discharge those loans prior to
being able to discharge bachelor's degree (or lower) loans.
For purposes of determining discharge eligibility, a debtor's payments on all
student loans will be considered, even if the debtor is not seeking discharge on all
loans. The purpose of this approach is to give the court complete insight into the
debtor's financial picture.
5. Reestablishing Loan Eligibility
Debtors could reestablish eligibility for federal student loans by satisfying the
Federal Student Aid (FSA) process for restoring loan eligibility-essentially
reaffirming their discharged student loan debt. FSA provides four options for
restoring loan eligibility to debtors who have defaulted: 1) pay the loans in full; 2)
make six payments of an agreed amount over a six month period; 3) consolidate
loans through a federally-approved program; or 4) rehabilitate the loans.438 Debtors
would be limited to one reaffirmation. A subsequent bankruptcy discharge would
render the debtor permanently ineligible to receive federal student loans.
6. Scope
The proposed framework would apply to federal loans only. Student loans
secured in the private market would fall outside the framework's purview. The
author believes that private loans should be dischargeable to the same extent as
other unsecured debt.439 This view is influenced by the fact that eligibility for a
private educational loan is based on a borrower's creditworthiness, not an
"enlightened" policy of broadening educational access. As such, private lenders are
able to minimize their exposure to credit risks. Thus, these loans should not be
given the same special treatment afforded federal loans, the vast majority for which
creditworthiness is not considered.
B. Issues Affecting Framework Implementation
Implementation of the proposed framework would be affected mainly by issues
related to costs and politics.
438. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FED. STUDENT AID, GOING BACK TO SCHOOL, available at
http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/going.back.to.school.html. See also, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., FED.
STUDENT AID, LOAN REHABILITATION, http://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/DCS/rehabilitation.html
(describing loan rehabilitation as making "at least nine [9] full payments of an agreed amount within twenty
[20] days of their monthly due dates over a ten [10] month period").
439. Prior to 1984, student loans obtained from an entity other than a "non-profit institution of higher
education" were treated the same in bankruptcy as other unsecured debt. However, Congress eventually
granted private student loans equivalent status to federal student loans in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Student Loan
Bankruptcy Exception, FINAID, available at http://www.finaid.org/questions/bankruptcyexception.phtml.
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1. Costs
A potential criticism of the framework is that it would increase the cost of
bankruptcy, thus, disadvantaging the debtors it seeks to help. In the aftermath of
the 2005 Act, filing bankruptcy became more expensive both in terms of filing fees
and the cost of legal representation. 440  Filing fee increases were statutory in
nature. 441  Increases in attorney's fees, while not technically statutory, were
nonetheless the result of the Act's heightened reporting and disclosure obligations.
These obligations, including those related to the means test, "increased the average
amount of time an attorney spent on each case", and thus resulted in higher fees.442
Proving eligibility for discharge under this framework would of course require
an attorney's time. But whether that time commitment would be greater than what
is already dedicated to determining undue hardship is unknown. One of the benefits
of the framework is heightened simplicity and efficiency. Thus, it seems entirely
possible that the framework could lead to less time expended by attorneys
determining their client's eligibility for discharge. If so, lower attorney's fees could
result.
2. Political Environment
As discussed earlier, the implications of student loan indebtedness have taken
on heightened prominence as debt levels have increased drastically. Proposed
solutions to student loan overindebtedness are varied, ranging from an expansion of
income-based repayment options,443 to a call for forgiveness of all student loan
debt,444 to a counterproductive encouragement of voluntary defaults by student loan
debtors.445 There are even some who believe the federal government should get out
of the student loan business altogether.446 Passions run high on all sides. Thus,
proposed reforms often elicit fierce support and even fiercer criticism.
440. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-697, BANKRUPTCY REFORM: DOLLAR COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, 4
(2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08697.pdf (concluding that attorney's fees rose an
average of 51% in Chapter 7 cases and 55% in Chapter 13 cases, while filing fees rose 43% in Chapter 7 cases
and 41% in Chapter 13 cases).
441. Id. at 5.
442. Id.at27.
443. See, e.g., COLLEGE BOARD, FULFILLING THE COMMITMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING
FEDERAL STUDENT AID 18 (2008), available at
http://professionals.collegeboard.com/profdownload/rethinking-stu-aid-fulfilling-commitment-
recommendations.pdf.
444. Robert Applebaum, Obama's Student Loan Reforms: Right Problem, Wrong Solution,
FORGIVESTUDENTLOANDEBT (Oct. 28, 2011), available at
http://forgivestudentloandebt.com/content/obamas-student-loan-reforns-right-problem-wrong-solution.
445. See, e.g., Lynn O'Shaughnessy, Is Occupy Student Debt Pledge Drive a Bust?, CBSNEWS (Dec. 12,
2011), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145 162-57341046/is-occupy-student-debt-pledge-
drive-a-bust/.
446. See, e.g., Richard Vedder, Subsidizing the College Bubble, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/10/27/should-college-grads-get-a-break-on-their-
loans/subsidizing-the-college-bubble.
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Given that the solvency of the student loan system has been an enduring,
though exaggerated, justification for restricting discharge of student loan debt, the
proposed framework was developed paying particular attention to ensuring that
only debtors who are legitimately facing crushing debt and few prospects for
repaying it would be incentivized to seek discharge. The framework acknowledges
that many student loan debtors would benefit from bankruptcy relief, but also
appreciates that a limitless expansion of such relief would be both inadvisable and
politically untenable.
CONCLUSION
With the cost of higher education and reliance on student loans both rising, an
increasing number of debtors will become overburdened with student loan debt.
This trend will be exacerbated by dismal educational outcomes, stubbornly high
unemployment, and stagnant wages. As such an increasing number of student loan
debtors will seek out bankruptcy relief.
The proposed framework was developed to effectively address this trend by
rendering the bankruptcy system fairer to federal student loan debtors and their
creditors-essentially, the taxpayers. The current system of determining undue
hardship is rife with ambiguity and subjectivity; therefore, it should be undone,
replaced by a framework that relies on objective measures and lends itself to
impartiality, economy, uniformity, and simplicity.
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